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A form.er Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
once stated that people in the securities industry could be reasonably sure 
they would not get into trouble with the Commission so long as they did 
what most of them agreed was the decent and honorable thing to do.1 The 
recent Report of Special Study of Securities Markets2 has demonstrated 
that, although there is presently no widespread pattern of fraud, in many 
instances those in the securities industry do not act in a decent and honor-
able manner. Thus, while the fundamental structure of the securities 
market is sound, and the basic regulatory patterns of the securities acts can 
be said to require no fundamental reconstruction, the present shortcomings 
must be analyzed and ultimately remedied if the securities market is to 
operate at an optimum level of efficiency and integrity. The acquisition of 
capital from the general public is so important to national economic growth 
that a securities market which operates at anything less than an optimum 
level cannot be tolerated. Therefore, it is essential that acts and practices 
which undermine public confidence in the securities market and harm the 
investors who furnish the funds necessary to adequate economic progress 
be eliminated. This comment analyzes four areas of central significance to ade-
quate protection for the investor: (1) qualifications of those in the securities 
industry who deal with the public; (2) dissemination of corporate publicity; 
(3) dissemination of investment advice; and (4) selling practices in the 
securities industry. The findings and recommendations of the Special Study 
are given special attention insofar as they bear upon the problems covered. 
In certain areas, however, recent developments in court and Commission 
decisions have brought about changes equally as significant as the findings 
and recommendations of the Special Study. Thus each section covers the 
background and recent developments in the designated area, as well as the 
Special Study itself. 
1 These are the words of the late Judge Healy, quoted in Loss, The SEC and the 
Broker-Dealer, I VAND. L. REv. 516 (1948). 
2 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (hereinafter cited as Special Study]. 
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l. QUALIFICATIONS OF SECURITIES PERSONNEL DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC 
The quality of personnel in the securities industry is highly significant 
in determining the impact of the industry upon the public. Securities per-
sonnel who deal with the public are in a key position, for the buying 
public must depend upon the ability and integrity of such personnel in 
obtaining access to the securities markets. The most important factor in-
fluencing the quality of personnel is the qualifications required for 
entering and remaining in the industry. Yet the present scheme of securities 
regulation does not impose sufficently high standards in this regard. This 
is amply demonstrated by a brief survey of the relevant agencies controlling 
industry qualifications. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission exercises supervisory jurisdic-
tion over the entire regulatory structure of the exchanges and the over-the-
counter markets under the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940.4 The philosophy behind these acts is simply 
that anyone should be able to enter the securities field unless barred by 
specific acts of misconduct. Thus no standards relating to knowledge, 
training, or experience in the securities business are imposed at the federal 
level. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), and the regional exchanges have generally adequate qualification 
standards for personnel of member firms. The selective basis of exchange 
membership, however, denies the public protection from the abuses that 
are widespread in other segments of the securities industry. The National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the self-regulatory association 
which polices the over-the-counter market, has prescribed examination and 
character requirements, but not training standards. While the overwhelm-
ing majority of over-the-counter brokerage firms which deal with the public 
are members of the NASD, there are significant sectors of the securities 
industry which do not belong to the NASD. State Blue Sky laws constitute 
the only source of restrictions on entry into the industry for the remaining 
brokers and dealers, and even in those states which have established quali-
fication standards, the strictness of the controls and the quality of their 
administration vary widely. 
As will be seen below,5 a high percentage of violations of Commission, 
exchange, and self-regulatory association rules are attributable to personnel 
with inadequate experience in the industry, and to firms with insufficient 
capitalization. This suggests that there is a relationship between the factors 
of experience, technical competence, and financial stability and those of 
integrity and business reliability. Thus the imposition of higher qualifica-
s 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). 
4 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). 
For a study of background of the provisions of these acts, see Loomis, The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1931 and the Jm,estment Advisers Act of 1910, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214 
(1959). 
IS See notes 24 & 35 infra. 
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tion standards might well have the effect of raising ethical standards and 
practices as well as technical competence itself. 
It will be the purpose of this section to analyze the present state of 
qualification standards in the securities industry, to examine the major 
defects in the regulatory structure, and to evaluate the solutions proposed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission6 and by the Special Study of 
Securities Markets.7 
A. Securities Personnel Who Deal With the Public 
There are several categories of persons in the securities industry who 
deal with the public.8 The broker is an agent of a private investor and 
handles the latter's order to buy or sell securities. For this service, a com-
mission is charged. Section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 act9 defines a broker as one 
who engages in the business of performing securities transactions for the 
account of others. In contrast, a dealer acts as a principal by buying 
securities for his own account and subsequently selling to customers from 
his own inventory.10 The dealer's profit is determined by the difference 
between the price he pays and the price he receives for the same security. 
Section 3(a)(5) of the 1934 act11 defines a dealer as one who buys and sells 
securities for his own account as part of a regular business. A dealer should 
be sharply differentiated from a trader. A trader is a private investor who 
regularly buys and sells securities for his own account but does not handle 
other persons' securities or money. Typically, broker-dealers are owners or 
principals of securities firms-either individual proprietors, partners, or 
officers. On the major exchanges, members act primarily as brokers for the 
public-buyers or sellers of listed stocks; approximately seventy-five percent 
of the total round-lot share volume on such exchanges consists of agency 
transactions for customers.12 Exchange rules limit the ability of members 
to deal with listed securities for their own accounts. For example, Rule 92 
of the New York Stock Exchange provides that no member shall buy or 
initiate the purchase of any security for his own account or for any account 
in which he or his member organization is directly or indirectly interested 
6 The Securities Exchange Commission has presented to Congress legislative proposals 
for amendment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1963). These proposals are based on the recommendations of the Special Study. 
See also H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Securities Exchange Commission is 
herein referred to as the SEC or the Commission. 
1 Special Study pt. 1, at iii-ix. 
s The scope of this section is limited to personnel in the securities industry who deal 
with the public. For instance, the specialist on an exchange, who usually deals only with 
members on the exchange floor, is not included. Investment advisers are given attention 
here only incidentally; regulation of investment advisers is considered in detail in section 
III infra. 
9 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1958). 
10 For a more comprehensive treatment of the distinction between brokers and dealers, 
see section IV infra. 
11 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1958). 
12 special Study pt. 2, at 9. 
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while the member has knowledge that his organization holds an unexecuted 
market order to buy the security in the unit of trading for the customer.is 
In the over-the-counter market, however, a firm or individual may combine 
the functions of broker and dealer, acting in one capacity or the other, 
depending upon the circumstances. Thus, an exchange firm which partici-
pates in the over-the-counter market may decide to trade unlisted stock on 
a principal rather than an agency basis.14 
Other functional roles are present. One or more may be performed by 
any given person. The supervisor, as the head of the branch office of a 
broker-dealer firm, may have influence and responsibility similar to that of 
the firm's owners. The salesman, who is employed by a broker-dealer firm 
to execute securities transactions for and with the public, has the most 
frequent personal contact with the public. From the standpoint of the 
public, however, the most important person in the industry is often the 
investment adviser, who is responsible for recommending that the customer 
buy or sell particular stocks. Investment advisers include every person who 
engages in the business of furnishing investment advice for a fee, either by 
managing investors' portfolios, or by publishing a subscription service, or 
both.111 In some firms, salesmen or the broker-dealer principal himself may 
make investment recommendations. While some broker-dealers are regis-
tered investment advisers,16 an investment adviser as defined in section 
2(1 I) of the Investment Advisers Act of 194017 does not include any broker 
or dealer whose performance of such service is solely incidental to his busi-
ness as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation for his 
advice. Many firms employ analysts, who base their investment advice on 
research. In such a case, the salesman acts as a conduit in the dissemination 
of investment advice. The investor may also engage the services of an in-
dependent investment adviser, using the broker-dealer firm only to perform 
the actual transaction. The dissemination of investment advice is given more 
attention in section III infra. 
B. Regulation of Securities Personnel 
I. Federal Controls 
Broker-dealer firms effecting any transaction in the over-the-counter 
market, except those whose business is exclusively intrastate, must register 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 15(b) of the 
13 NYSE Rule 92. 
H A relatively small but increasing percentage of listed stock is traded in the over-
the-counter market by firms not members of an exchange. Also, some issuers choose not 
to list their stocks even though the security would satisfy exchange trading standards. See 
Special Study pt. 1, at 14. 
111 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 2(11), 54 Stat. 848, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 
80b-2(a)(ll) (1958). 
10 As of June 30, 1962, 1836 investment advisers were registered with the Commission. 
Those broker-dealers which are registered investment advisers primarily engage in the 
brokerage business. Special Study pt. 1, at 19. 
17 54 Stat. 848 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll)(c) (1958). 
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1934 Act.18 The securities industry includes a small group of large broker-
dealer firms which employ numerous salesmen and supervisors at numerous 
branch offices; they hold a dominant share of the public business. This 
group consists primarily of large firms which do a general business on both 
the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets, firms which are members 
of the NASD and one or more exchanges, and large mutual fund sales or-
ganizations-not members of any exchange and sometimes not even mem-
bers of the NASD. On the other hand, there are many small firms in the 
securities industry; they have, a less substantial but still significant share of 
the public business. In fact, the vast majority of registered broker-dealers 
have only one office. Of the nearly 6,000 broker-dealers registered with the 
Commission on June 30, 1962, thirty percent were sole proprietorships.19 
The standards for denial of registration of a firm by the Commission 
under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act20 relate primarily to specified past acts of 
misconduct. These statutory disqualifications include the filing of a false or 
misleading statement in the application for registration, a conviction 
within the ten years preceding for a felony or misdemeanor concerning 
securities, an injunction by a federal or state court against conduct involv-
ing securities, and willful violation of the Securities Act of 1933,21 the 
1934 Act, or any of the rules and regulations of the Commission. In addition, 
the Commission must find that denial or revocation of the registration of 
a broker-dealer firm is in the public interest. In applying for registration, a 
firm must complete application form BD and list whether any of its per-
sonnel are subject to any of the statutory disqualifications. The Commission 
may deny or revoke the registration of a firm upon a finding that the 
broker-dealer principal, partner, director, officer, branch office manager, or 
"any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled" by the broker-
dealer has committed one of the proscribed acts of misconduct.22 
Section 15(b) does not establish standards of competence as to knowl-
edge, training, and experience in the securities business for the firm's per-
sonnel as a prerequisite to the firm's registration. Factual findings of the 
Special Study demonstrate the high number of inexperienced principals in 
newly registered broker-dealer firms. For example, of the 210 firms which 
registered with the Commission during the first three months of 1961, 58, 
18 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958). 
10 Special Study pt. 1, at 16. 
20 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958). On the denial and 
revocation of registration of broker-dealer firms, see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 
1301-58 (1961), and cases therein cited [hereinafter cited as Loss]. 
21 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). 
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b), 49 Stat. 1377, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(b) (1958). A brokerage firm, therefore, can be registered only if none of its per-
sonnel are subject to any of the statutory disqualifications. The Commission has taken 
the position that an employee of a broker-dealer is a controlled person within the 
meaning of § 15(b) of the 1934 Act. See 2 Loss 1314-23. However, the Commission fre-
quently consents to the hiring of a person subject to a revocation order upon condition 
that he be appropriately supervised and not be given any managerial responsibility. 
See 2 Loss 1329-30. 
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or 28 percent, did not have experienced persons as principals, and over 
half the firms had principals with less than two years experience.23 Gener-
ally, the most recently registered securities firms-especially those with 
inexperienced principals-have been responsible for a heavy preponderance 
of the more severe disciplinary penalties assessed by the NASD. In addition, 
such firms have frequently violated the net capital rule of the Commission 
and have often engaged in underwriting speculative stock issues.24 
Investment advisers25 must register with the Commission under section 
203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.26 Any one of a similar group of 
specific acts of misconduct constitutes statutory disqualification,27 but no 
positive standards of competence or integrity are prescribed for investment 
advisers at the federal level. Newly registered investment adviser firms, 
like new broker-dealers, exhibit a high number of inexperienced principals. 
During a three-month period in 1961, 79 firms, with a total of 141 principals, 
registered with the Commission. Eighty-nine principals, or 63 percent, had 
no prior experience in the securities business.28 
Section 15(b)(D) of the Exchange Act, which deals with willful violations 
of the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act, or any of the rules and regulations by 
the Commission promulgated pursuant to these acts,29 is utilized by the 
Commission when it seeks to revoke the registration of a securities firm. In 
order to determine whether brokerage firms are in compliance with section 
15(b)(D), the Commission undertakes periodic examinations of broker-
dealer firms through its regional offices. A typical full-scale examination of a 
brokerage firm determines its financial condition, its selling practices, its 
treatment of customers' funds and securities, and its compliance with the 
credit regulations of the Federal Reserve Board30 and the bookkeeping and 
financial report rules of the Commission. 31 
Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act32 gives the Commission authority 
to promulgate rules with respect to financial responsibility of broker-dealer 
firms in order to protect investors. Thus the Commission has adopted 
Rule 15c3-l,33 which prescribes that no broker or dealer shall permit his 
aggregate indebtedness to exceed an amount equal to twenty times his net 
capital. The Special Study found that low capital firms have a much 
23 Special Study pt. I, at 65. See also 23 SEC ANN. REP. 78 (1957). 
24 Special Study pt. 1, at 66-67. 
25 On the regulation of investment advisers generally, see section III infra. 
20 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
27 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) 
(Supp. IV, 1963). 
2s special Study pt. 1, at 146. 
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(D), 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(D) 1958). 
so See Comment, Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation 
of Regulation T, 61 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1963). 
Sl On the inspection procedures of the Commission, see 20 SEC ANN. REP. 43 (1954); 
22 SEC ANN. REP. 112 (1956); 25 SEC ANN. REP. 107 (1959). 
82 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1958). 
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
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greater chance of falling into net capital difficulties than firms with higher 
capital. For example, 210 of the 220 broker-dealers whose reports indi-
cated violation of the Commission's capital rule ratio had net capital of less 
than 5,000 dollars.84 Moreover, low capital firms have been involved in a 
high proportion of the Commission's revocation actions and have engaged 
excessively in the underwriting of "unseasoned," speculative stock issues.35 
Neither the Commission nor the NASD imposes minimum capital require-
ments upon securities firms. It would appear that the net capital rule, as it 
presently stands, does not by itself insure the sound financial status for 
brokerage firms which is necessary to protect the public. 
2. NASD Regulation 
Section 15A of the Exchange Act36 authorizes the registration of na-
tional securities associations to provide self-regulation in the over-the-
counter market similar to that provided by the exchanges in the exchange 
markets. At the present time, the NASD is the only registered national secu-
rities association.37 The NASD rules allow member firms to grant discounts 
on prices or commission rates only to member firms.38 Thus a member firm 
must deal with each nonmember firm on the same terms and conditions as 
it deals with the general public. Membership in the NASD is an economic 
necessity if one is to engage profitably in almost any phase of underwriting 
and most over-the-counter business. The overwhelming majority of securi-
ties firms doing business in the over-the-counter market, including member 
firms of the exchanges, have therefore joined the NASD. The Special Study 
covered 4,964 over-the-counter firms and found that 4,417 were members of 
the NASD.89 Nevertheless, there remain many firms not members of the 
NASD, including firms whose business is limited to the exchanges; certain 
mutual fund, real estate security, and investment adviser firms; and put and 
call dealers. 
The NASD by-laws bar from membership any broker or dealer who 
has been subject to (1) a suspension or expulsion order by an exchange or 
association for unjust and inequitable conduct, (2) a denial or revocation 
of registration order by the Commission, (3) an order of suspension or 
expulsion from membership in an exchange or association, entered by the 
Commission, or (4) a conviction within the ten years preceding for a felony 
or misdemeanor involving fraud.40 These exclusions apply not only to the 
34 special Study pt. 1, at 91. 
35 Id. at 91-92. 
86 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1958). The essential purpose of the 
Maloney Act of 1938, which added § 15A to the Exchange Act, was to provide for 
a self-regulatory association in the over-the-counter market. See 2 Loss 1359-64. 
37 On the NASD, see generally Cherrington, National Association of Securities 
Dealers, 27 HARV. Bus. REY. 741 (1949); White, National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., 28 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 250 (1959). 
38 NASD RULES OF FAm PRACTICE art. III, § 25. 
39 Special Study pt. 1, at 16. 
40 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(a); see 22 SEC ANN. REP. 117 (1956). The Exchange Act 
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broker-dealer principal, but also to any partner, officer, director, branch 
office manager, or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled 
by the broker-dealer.41 Thus, to become a member of the NASD, a broker-
dealer principal must show that all of its personnel are free of such dis-
qualifications.42 To enforce compliance with its by-laws and rules of fair 
practice, the NASD has its own inspection program and a well organized 
disciplinary procedure.43 
Prior to 1955, the NASD required no standards as to experience and 
knowledge of the securities business. In that year, however, the NASD 
amended its by-laws and restricted admission to those firms whose pro-
prietors, partners, officers, and other persons controlling the firm had had 
one year's experience in the securities business or had passed a written 
examination.44 The new by-laws also prohibited member firms from em-
ploying salesmen who had neither had one year's experience in the securi-
ties business nor had passed a written examination for registered repre-
sentatives. 45 At first, the NASD gave the same relatively easy examination 
to all classes of inexperienced personnel, such as proprietors, branch office 
managers, and salesmen. Recently, however, the NASD has taken steps 
to increase the breadth and difficulty of its written examination for sales-
men. 46 The use of an examination as the primary test of the competence 
of a securities salesman is highly advisable in view of the diverse occupa-
tional backgrounds and educational levels of applicants seeking to become 
registered representatives.47 
provides that association rules must make an over-the-counter broker or dealer eligible 
for membership unless he has been guilty of specific violations of securities laws or ex-
change or association rules. The act, however, allows the association to restrict member-
ship geographically, or by the type of business of the members, or on such other specified 
and appropriate basis as appears to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate for 
the protection of investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15A(b)(3) &: (4), 52 Stat. 
1070 (1938). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(3) &: (4) (1958). 
41 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(a), art. XV, § 3(b). 
42 The Commission must approve the registration of a salesman whose record shows 
a prior revocation by the NASD, the SEC, or an exchange. See NASD, THE NASD 
AND THE REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE 40-41 (1961). See also 2 Loss 1381-87. 
43 See 2 id. at 1371-74; see White, supra note 37, at 256-58. See also MAYER, WALL 
STREET: MEN AND MONEY 230-32 (1955). 
44 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(b); see 22 SEC ANN. REP. 119 (1956). 
45 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(b). Registered representative includes every employee of 
a member firm engaged in the managing, supervising, solicitating, trading, handling, and 
selling of listed or unlisted securities. NASD BY-LAWS art. XV, § I. 
46 Since 1961, the NASD has given qualifying examinations. In 1961, 3% of the 
30,790 examinations scored resulted in failure; in 1962, the failure rate was 14% of 
16,186 examinations. Since November 1962, with an increased passing grade, one-third 
of those taking the examination have failed to achieve a passing score. Special Study pt. 
1, at 120. It should be noted that since July 1, 1963 a single combined examination has 
been given for salesmen employed by members of the NASD and the New York and 
American Stock Exchanges. Two hours are devoted to general securities subjects and 
NASD problems. The third hour deals with exchange problems of a more complex 
nature. Ibid. 
47 A 1961 NASD survey revealed that 99% of the newly registered representatives 
attended high school and 68% spent some time at college. Id. at 96. A 1960 NASD survey 
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The NASD has recently taken the position that principals and super-
visors should have a greater degree of knowledge of the securities business 
than that of salesmen. Consequently, the Board of Governors of the NASD 
in 1962 authorized the development of a separate three-hour written exam-
ination for all proprietors, partners, and officers of member firms who lack 
one year's experience in the securities industry. A new type of examina-
tion for principals and branch office managers, including material on 
supervisory responsibility, was initiated on December 1, 1963. The Special 
Study reported that most general securities firms require a supervisor to 
have three years experience in the securities business, although some may 
require as little as one year. Low-capital firms and certain mutual fund firms, 
however, often have supervisors with no experience and limited education.48 
The NASD does not make an independent determination of the in, 
tegrity of an applicant for a position as a salesman. However, it does 
require that a member who employs a registered representative have reason 
to believe that the person is of good character and business repute. A re-
sponsible partner, officer, director, or branch office manager must sign a 
certification to this effect after a reasonably diligent investigation of the 
applicant's background.49 If the member firm is not sufficiently indus-
trious in searching for unfavorable aspects of a candidate's past history, 
it may be subjected to disciplinary action by the NASD. 
Since the NASD entrance requirements concerning competence and 
integrity are directed at personnel who are engaged in the managing, 
supervising, trading, and selling of listed and unlisted securities, an analyst 
who participates solely in research activities for the brokerage firm need 
not comply with these qualifications. Furthermore, the New York Stock 
Exchange does not impose on analysts separate entrance requirements per-
taining to research and evaluation of securities. Nevertheless, the Special 
Study found that the level of educational background of those engaged in 
research is unusually high. The great majority hold a college degree, and 
a considerable number have undertaken graduate studies in different 
fields. Moreover, some firms have training programs for analysts, and 
others hire only experienced analysts. Some firms, however, still allow 
inexperienced analysts with minimal training or supervision to make in-
vestment recommendations to the public.rm 
The NASD, by tightening its examination and character requirements, 
showed that 47% of the salesmen came from professional categories, such as accountants, 
teachers, engineers, and lawyers, and from relatively skilled occupations in a supervisory 
capacity. On the other hand, 19% came from a heterogeneous group of occupations. 
Id at 95. Furthermore, the Special Study found that about 50% of the firms covered in 
the survey bad no particular educational prerequisites for prospective salesmen, and 
75% of the firms had no requirements of previous experience in the securities industry. 
Id. at 100. 
48 Id. at 136. 
49 NASD RuLES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III, § 27(c); see Matters of Vickers, Christy 
&: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6872, August 8, 1962. 
50 special Study pt. 1, at 145. 
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is seeking to bring better qualified personnel into the over-the-counter 
firms. The effort of the NASD to raise its qualification standards is deficient 
in one major respect: it does not require a minimum training period for 
registered representatives and does not examine or approve the training 
programs of its members. However, the NASD has recently prepared a 
training guide for use by member firms in their training program. 
The Special Study found that training programs of firms not members 
of the major exchanges typically involve some on-the-job training, sup-
plemented by lecturing or tutoring sessions. In addition, the Report noted 
that mutual fund firms tend to devote substantially fewer hours to on-the-
job training than general securities firms. Even so, over half the firms not 
specializing in mutual funds give no on-the-job training at all.'51 Further-
more, the Special Study indicated that a substantial number of NASD 
firms give no more training than is required to pass the written examina-
tion and become familiar with the type of securities in which the particular 
brokerage firm specializes.52 Thus, it would appear that a major weakness 
of training programs of firms in the over-the-counter market is the tendency 
to overemphasize the business of the particular firm, leaving registered 
representatives lacking in over-all knowledge of the securities industry. To 
remedy these deficiencies, a proper training program should accomplish 
two primary objectives. First, all securities salesmen should be given more 
comprehensive instruction in all aspects of the securities business. Second, 
all personnel should be taught the importance of developing professional 
responsibility in the firm-client relationship. 
3. Exchange Regulation 
Upon registration as a national securities exchange under section 6 of 
the 1934 Act,53 an exchange must establish membership rules which are 
just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors.54 The 
New York Stock Exchange requires that an applicant for membership or 
allied membership serve six months as a trainee in a member firm if he 
proposes to do business with the public and lacks previous experience in 
the securities business.55 The Midwest and American Stock Exchanges 
51 Id. at Ill. 
52 Id. at HO. 
5S 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f) (1958). 
II¼ Securites Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(d), 48 Stat. 886, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1958). The 
Commission has supervisory authority over exchange affairs. Under § 19(b) of the 1934 
Act, it may amend the rules of the exchanges with respect to the financial responsibility 
of the members and similar matters when the exchanges fail to act after appropriate 
notice. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1958). Moreover, the SEC, under § 19(a) of 
the 1934 Act, has the power to withdraw the registration of a national securities exchange. 
48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(l) (1958). On exchange regulation, see generally 2 
Loss 1149-1276. 
55 NYSE RULE 301.12. Only individuals can hold seats or be members of the exchange. 
NYSE CONSTITUTION art. IX, §§ 1-2. The upper limit on Exchange membership is 1,374. 
As of June 30, 1962, the membership of the NYSE was 1,366. This figure included 1,011 
individuals affiliated with 672 firms. About 500 NYSE firms do business with the public. 
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impose six-month training periods upon prospective members and allied 
members.56 Under Rule 342 of the NYSE, a member firm must secure the 
approval of the Exchange for its choice of a branch office manager as a 
new supervisor in either an existing office or a new regional office.57 The 
Special Study found that large New York Stock Exchange member firms 
seldom appoint personnel with less than ten years experience to positions 
of supervisory responsibility.58 
Any candidate for the position of registered representative in the NYSE 
-which includes all employees engaged in soliciting, trading, handling, 
and selling listed and unlisted securities59-must undergo a six-month 
training period if he has had no previous experience in the securities in-
dustry. 60 Each salesman-trainee is expected to undertake on-the-job train-
ing supplemented by organized study. The Special Study determined that 
a dozen large member firms have organized classroom training in such 
depth that it might be called a school.61 For example, Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., in its model training program, requires all its 
trainees to spend fourteen weeks of intensive classroom training at the 
New York City home office. A total of 420 classroom hours are spent on 
a broad range of securities subjects. However, since the cost of intensive 
classroom training is very high, most NYSE firms, both large and small, 
merely combine on-the-job training with courses taken by correspondence 
or at local universities.62 A salesman-trainee who performs his on-the-job 
training at the home office of a member firm in a metropolitan center will 
likely learn much about the important aspects of the industry. Neverthe-
less, the Special Study found that a major problem with on-the-job train-
Special Study pt. 1, at 12, 16. There is no upper limit on the number of allied members 
in the New York Stock Exchange; there were 6,238 in 1962. Id. pt. 1, at 12. In general, 
an allied member has no right to be on the floor of the exchange. NYSE CoNSTITUTlON 
art. IX,§ 11. 
56 Special Study pt. 1, at 80-81. It is significant that the investigations of the Special 
Study have accelerated the efforts of the various regulatory bodies to impose higher 
qualification standards for securities personnel. For example, as of January, 1962, an 
applicant for regular membership on the American Stock Exchange was not required to 
have any experience, knowledge, or training in the securities business, and no examina• 
tion tested his qualifications. Now the six-month training period is required. See SEC, 
REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CoNoucr OF MEMBERS OF 
THE AMERICAN STOCK ExcHANGE 7 (1962). 
57 NYSE RULE 342. 
58 Special Study pt. 1, at 138. 
59 NYSE RULE 10. 
60 NYSE RuLE 345.15. It should be noted that the NYSE provides for a system of 
limited registration under which the salesman may sell only -mutual fund shares or 
stock selected by the salesman's firm under a Monthly Investment Plan. Formerly, the 
NYSE required only one month's training for limited registrants. See NYSE RULE 
30I.15(b); NYSE RuLE 301.ll(b). The Exchange now requires that limited registrants have 
three months of training. Also, limited registration selling may continue only for a seven• 
month period. The examination for limited registrants contains two-thirds of the material 
in the regular NYSE test for registered representatives. See Special Study pt. I, at 126-28. 
61 Id. at 105. 
62 Id. at 106-07. 
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ing is that firms are frequently content to let their trainees watch the 
regular employees sell securities for the full six-month training period. 
The candidates do not obtain actual training practice under the supervi-
sion of regular firm personnel.63 Moreover, many firms send their trainees 
to a remote branch office far from the financial centers of the nation, 
where on-the-job training consists of the performance of menial tasks. 
The major defect in the training requirements for salesmen on the New 
York Stock Exchange is that, while the Exchange imposes a six-month 
training period, it does not evaluate the quality of the training programs 
established by the member firms. 
Prior to December, 1962, applicants for membership and allied mem-
bership in the New York Stock Exchange had to pass either the examina-
tion for registered representatives or specified courses at universities 
approved by the Exchange.64 The Board of Governors of the NYSE, how-
ever, has now established a compulsory written examination for members 
and allied members; it covers general securities subjects, exchange rules 
and procedures, the responsibilities of proprietors of member firms, and 
the supervision of offices, salesmen, and accounts. Inexperienced members 
and allied members who plan to service customers' accounts must also pass 
the Exchange examination for registered representatives.65 The revised 
compulsory examination for registered representatives now covers securi-
ties market procedure, securities and their analysis, and elements of finance. 
In addition, the NYSE plans a separate written examination dealing with 
problems of supervisory responsibility for branch office managers. Both 
the American and Midwest Stock Exchanges require that registered repre-
sentatives pass a written examination; these exchanges will soon require 
an examination for proprietors similar to that of the NYSE. 
In the matter of character standards, the NYSE undertakes an elaborate 
investigation of the integrity of a prospective member or allied member. 
It utilizes the facilities of its staff as well as independent investigating 
agencies to check the applicant's business history, personal reputation, and 
educational background. Applicants must be sponsored by two members 
or allied members of at least one year's standing who will recommend the 
candidate from personal knowledge of him and of his business connec-
tions. 66 In an effort to improve the quality of its members' salesmen, the 
NYSE has recommended that its member firms require applicants to take 
aptitude tests and undergo a series of personal interviews. In addition, some 
exchange firms frequently hire an outside investigating agency to check on 
the background of the applicant prior to the final decision to accept him 
for employment. 
All exchanges impose on their member firms requirements as to both 
oa Id. at 107. 
64 NYSE. RULE 301.12. 
llll Special Study pt. 1, at 78. 
Oil NYSE RuLE 301.24. 
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minimum capital and aggregate debt to net capital ratios. For example, 
the New York Stock Exchange requires that a member firm doing a gen-
eral business with the public have net capital of 50,000 dollars and main-
tain a twenty-to-one ratio between its aggregate indebtedness and its net 
capital.67 In addition, the initial net capital of a member firm must be 
at least 120 percent of the minimum net capital requirement.68 The Com-
mission has exempted all members of the major exchanges from its net 
capital rule because the capital requirements of the exchange are more 
comprehensive than Rule 15c3-I.69 
4. State Controls 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains an express provision 
preserving the jurisdiction of state Blue Sky securities Iaws.70 A state has 
a legitimate interest in establishing qualification standards for brokers, 
dealers, and salesmen in order to protect its citizens. Consequently, forty-
seven states require the registration of broker-dealers,71 and forty-eight 
states impose the duty of registration upon salesmen.72 Supervisors and 
analysts, however, insofar as they do not engage in selling activities, need 
no~ register under state Blue Sky laws. It is significant that in New York, 
the leading commercial state of the nation, the registration requirements 
for broker-dealers and salesmen may be easily satisfied.73 An applicant 
need only list his business history for the preceding five years, his criminal 
record, and his educational background. Registration is automatic. Since 
there are no provisions for the denial or revocation of the registration of 
broker-dealers and salesmen, it is apparent that the registration provisions 
are only an adjunct to the criminal fraud provisions. 
It would appear that state Blue Sky legislation could be extremely 
helpful in protecting the public in two particular areas. First, the states 
might enact minimum capital surety bond requirements.74 Since the state 
67 NYSE RULE 325(a). The American and Midwest Stock Exchanges require that 
member firms doing business with the public have net capital of $50,000 and $25,000, 
respectively. ASE Rule 446(a); Special Study pt. 1, at 88. 
68 NYSE RuLE 325(a). 
69 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lb2 (Cum. Supp. 1963). The exemption may be withdrawn 
by the Commission upon ten days notice to the exchanges when it is necessary in the 
public interest. 
70 Exchange Act § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1958). 
71 Delaware, Nevada, and the District of Columbia do not have Blue Sky securities 
legislation. Wyoming does not require the registration of broker-dealers. 
72 Wyoming requires that a promoter offering securities for sale "either as principal 
or through brokers or agents" file the names and addresses of his agents, partners, and 
ten percent shareholders with the secretary of state. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-103(7), (8) 
(1957). 
73 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359(e). 
74 Section 202(e) of the Uniform Securities Act provides that the Administrator may 
by rule require broker-dealers to post surety bonds up to $10,000, but no bond is required 
for any registrant whose net capital exceeds $25,000. See Loss &: CoWETT, PROPOSED UNI• 
FORM SECURITIES Ac:r (1956). New Mexico provides for both a minimum capital require-
ment and a net capital rule. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20 (Supp. 1961). Michigan pro• 
vides that every broker-dealer must post a $10,000 surety bond. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.762 
(1959). 
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securities commissions would be familiar with the securities transactions 
generally prevalent in the community, they could establish an absolute 
minimum capital for the one-man proprietorship and require increased 
capital for firms with additional branch offices and salesmen. The de-
frauded private investor could resort to the surety bond in satisfaction of 
his claim against the firm. Second, the state securities commissions should 
be given power to deny the registration of broker-dealers and salesmen for 
lack of training, knowledge, or experience in the securities business, and to 
revoke registrations for dishonest or unethical selling practices. Such a 
provision applicable to broker-dealers is included in the qualification section 
of the Uniform Securities Act, presently adopted by fifteen states.75 Under 
the Uniform Act the administrator is authorized in his discretion to give a 
written examination to any class of applicants.76 Unfortunately, the enforce-
ment of state Blue Sky laws remains handicapped by low budgets, small 
staffs, and local political pressures.77 Thus, with the possible exception of a 
few major industrial states, the effectiveness of state securities legislation in 
protecting the public against abuses by personnel in the securities industry is 
extremely uncertain. The public must therefore look to the Commission, 
the exchanges, and self-regulatory associations for adequate qualification 
standards and nonpartisan enforcement. 
C. The Special Study Report 
I. Recommendations at the Federal Level 
Under the present federal law, when an employee of a broker-dealer 
firm violates any provision of the securities acts or any of the regulations 
issued pursuant to these acts by the Commission, the SEC must proceed 
against the firm. This may be a considerable hardship on an innocent 
firm unaware of the dishonest conduct of its employee. Consequently, the 
Commission and the Special Study have proposed that the SEC be given 
the power to take disciplinary action directly against the individual wrong-
doer. 78 
75 Uniform Securities Act §§ 204(a)(2)(I), (a)(2)(C). States which have adopted the 
qualification section of the Uniform Securities Act: ALA. CoDE tit. 53, § 29 (Supp. 1961); 
ALASKA CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 45.55.030 to .55.060 (1962); Au;. STAT. §§ 67-1237 to -1240 
(Supp. 1961); CoLO. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 125-10-2 to -10-5 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-1254 (Supp. 1961); KY. REY. STAT. ANN. § 292.330 (1962); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 
32A, §§ 15-18 (Supp. 1962); MoNT. REY. CoDES ANN. § 15-2006 (Cum. Supp. 1963); N.J. 
REv. STAT. §§ 49:3-9 to -11 (Supp. 1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 201-04 (Supp. 1962); 
S.C. CoDE §§ 62-101 to -122 (1962); WASH. REY. CoDE ANN. § 21.20.040 to .130 (1961). 
Three other states have adopted the Uniform Act without the qualification section for 
broker-dealers: HAWAII REY. LAws §§ 199-1 to -20 (Supp. 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-829 
to -853 (1960); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to -527 (1956). 
76 Uniform Securities Act § 204(b)(6). Kansas requires an examination only of those 
broker-dealers and salesmen who have not passed the tests for the American, New York, 
Midwest, or Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1254(b) (Supp. 
1961) and Rule 81-8-1, 1 CCH BLUE SK.Y L. REP. 1[ 19613 (1962). 
77 See l Loss 105-107. But see Blue Sky Crackdown, The Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1963, 
p. I, col. 8. 
78 Special Study pt. 1, at 160. H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642. 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963). 
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A serious problem encountered by the Special Study involves the extent 
to which many smaller firms have hired "boiler-room" salesmen with past 
records of employment by firms against which the Commission has taken 
disciplinary action. While these boiler-room veterans were willing par-
ticipants in the proscribed conduct of the firm, the Commission was often 
unable, for administrative reasons, to make them parties to the disciplinary 
proceedings.79 This problem would be remedied if the Commission could 
bring disciplinary proceedings directly against individual wrongdoers. 
Moreover, the Commission has recommended that it be made unlawful 
for a firm to hire a salesman without the consent of the Commission when 
a disciplinary order has been entered against him, and the firm with rea-
sonable care should have known of the order.80 
The Commission has proposed that it be given the power to take dis-
ciplinary action against a firm or employee who aids, abets, counsels, or 
fails reasonably to supervise the employee who actually committed the 
violation of the particular provision, rule, or regulation.81 Thus the Com-
mission could put pressure on firms to improve their procedures for de-
tecting violations of the securities acts by their employees. At the same 
time, however, the firm with an adequate supervisory system would be 
protected. A brokerage firm could assert as a valid defense in an action 
brought against it by the Commission that it had established checkin~ 
procedures which were reasonably designed to detect securities violations 
by its employees, and that it reasonably performed its duties under such 
a system without knowledge of the activities of the fraudulent salesman.82 
At present, full revocation of a firm's registration is the Commission's 
only disciplinary tool. This may be a harsh remedy when the firm has 
committed only a minor violation. At the same time, it does not seem 
just that the firm should totally escape any penalty. The Commission has 
therefore proposed that it be given the power in its discretion to revoke 
fully, or suspend up to twelve months, the registration of an offending firm, 
or the right of any person to be associated with the firm.88 Alternatively, 
the Commission could censure the guilty fi.rm.84 Thus the Commission 
would be adequately equipped to deal with a relatively minor violation 
by a broker-dealer principal or salesman. As a supplementary measure, 
the Commission has suggested that the conviction disqualification for reg-
istration be broadened to include any felony or any misdemeanor involv-
79 See 2 Loss 1314-23. 
so H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963). 
81 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963). 
82 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 
(1963). 
83 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 
(1963). 
84 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 
(1963). 
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ing securities, to correspond with the requirements of the Investment 
Advisers Act,85 
2. Compulsory Membership in Self-Regulatory Associations 
It should be recognized that the Special Study and Commission pro-
posals at the federal level relate only to improved detection and punish-
ment of the prohibited acts of misconduct constituting statutory disquali-
fication. No affirmative standards of knowledge, experience, and training 
have been proposed. Both the Special Study and the Commission have 
taken the position that self-regulatory associations should have the primary 
responsibility for promulgating such positive qualification standards for 
their member firms. As a condition of registration with the Commission, 
the broker-dealer would be required to become a member of a registered 
national securities association.86 The self-regulatory associations would be 
given power to require standards of experience, training, and knowledge, 
including a mandatory examination for each class of applicants. This 
proposal constitutes the most important recommendation of the Special 
Study in the area of qualifications, for it combines two vital objectives. 
Under this compulsory membership plan, stricter qualification standards 
would lead to a higher level of professional responsibility among member 
firms in their dealing with private investors. Moreover, the fact that a 
self-regulatory group rather than a government agency will enact the higher 
entrance standards is likely to be conducive to more enthusiastic response 
by member firms, in both the designing and enforcement of such standards. 
Ultimately, higher qualification standards for securities personnel should 
engender increased public confidence in all phases of the securities markets. 
The Special Study recommended that the basic test for the competence 
of securities personnel be the examination.87 The ideal examination would 
contain a core of basic securities subjects, with sections of increased breadth 
and difficulty for those performing proprietary or supervisory responsibili-
ties. The Special Study also proposed that an experience requirement be 
imposed on at least one principal of each broker-dealer firm, and prefer-
ably all supervisors.88 This proposal is desirable because proprietary and 
supervisory positions should be filled by men with acknowledged abilities 
in leadership, supervision, and coordination of firm activities. Firms with 
inexperienced principals, it should be remembered, have been involved in 
a large percentage of the serious disciplinary actions by the SEC.89 Finally, 
the Special Study urged that all analysts and investment advisers whose 
85 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 
(1963); see special Study pt. 1, at 159. 
86 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-23 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-23 (1963). 
See also Special Study pt. 1, at 159. 
81 Id. at 160-61. 
88 Id. at 161. 
so See notes 24 &: 35 supra. 
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unsupervised investment recommendations are actually transmitted to the 
public should be subjected to an entrance examination.9o Such a recom-
mendation is meritorious, since one who directly advises private investors 
about securities should be subjected to at least a minimal requirement of 
competence. 
With reference to standards of integrity, the Special Study proposed 
that there be established local character and fitness committees to pass on 
the character of each applicant. However, the Special Study disapproved 
of the NASD system of member certification of the integrity of registered 
representatives on the ground that member firms too frequently make only 
cursory checks of the backgrounds of their candidates.91 However, the 
NASD system is not entirely without merit, because it places maximum re-
sponsibility on the firm to train only those applicants of the highest in-
tegrity. While committees of the self-regulatory associations may appro-
priately supervise the general character standards of salesmen, it is the 
individual firm which makes the final decision to hire the applicant. A 
member firm, therefore, should have an obligation to use reasonable dili-
gence in its character check upon potential salesmen. Stronger disciplinary 
action by self-regulatory associations could make this duty one that must 
be obeyed in fact. The NASD is now processing over 30,000 applications 
each year for registered representatives;92 obviously, character committees 
cannot feasibly make a thorough check on the background of each candidate. 
It is submitted that all the self-regulatory associations should require 
a six-month training program for inexperienced personnel of member firms, 
as the NYSE presently does.93 The content of a minimum training pro-
gram should include on-the-job training, supplemented by organized out-
side study, either at a local university or by correspondence. The associa-
tions should supervise the manner in which firms carry out their training 
programs. A salesman-trainee should not be allowed to deal with the pub-
lic until his training period has been completed. In addition, the associa-
tions might require a minimum rate of compensation for salesmen-trainees 
in order to decrease the high rate of turnover during training periods.9• 
This turnover rate resulting from inadequate compensation makes it more 
difficult to train and retain capable men. 
The Special Study recommended that the self-regulatory associations 
be given power to enact minimum capital requirements for member firms.911 
The NASD has long advocated such a requirement. Indeed, in National 
Ass'n of Securities Dealers96 the NASD proposed an amendment to its by-
90 special Study pt. 1, at 158. 
91 Id. at 117-118, 161. 
92 Id. at 117. 
93 See note 55 supra. 
94 Special Study pt. 1, at 96-98. 
95 Id. at 161-62. 
96 12 S.E.C. 322 (1942); cf. DeWitt Investment Co., 27 S.E.C. 976 (1948) (NASD may 
not impose quantitative standards for membership). 
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laws requiring that all members and prospective members dealing directly 
with the public have a minimum net capital of 5,000 dollars. The Com-
mission, however, held that a minimum capital requirement was not an 
appropriate basis for determination of membership under the 1934 Act. 
The Commission has now proposed that self-regulatory associations be 
given authority to promulgate standards dealing with financial responsibility 
of member firms. 01 
The minimum capital requirement is a worthwhile recommendation. 
The paramount public interest necessitates that firms with marginal capital 
be excluded from participation in the securities industry. Factual findings 
from the Special Study demonstrate that low capital firms have engaged 
excessively in the underwriting of speculative stocks and have incurred a 
large proportion of violations of the net capital rules of the SEC.98 Even 
a competent person ought to be prevented from starting his own brokerage 
firm if he does not have adequate financial backing. Such a person, how-
ever, could be employed as a salesman for a member firm. 
3. The Part-Time Salesman 
Another major problem facing the Special Study was the future of the 
part-time salesman. Unlike the exchanges, which require that all regis-
tered representatives devote their full time to the business of their member 
firms,00 the NASD has permitted its member firms to employ part-time 
salesmen. During 1961, of the 40,590 persons registered as salesmen with 
the NASD, 20,990 stated that they were employed on a part-time basis with 
NASD member firms.100 Mutual fund firms, in particular, have hired a 
large percentage of part-time salesmen. Opponents of part-time salesmen 
have argued that this group lacks adequate training, engages in overly 
aggressive selling tactics, and exhibits improper supervision. The Special 
Study concluded that, where these characteristics exist in securities firms, 
they are common to both full-time and part-time salesmen. The Report 
therefore recommended that part-time and full-time salesmen should be 
subjected to the same qualification standards.101 This suggestion that im-
proved entrance standards be applicable to all salesmen across the board is 
reasonable. It would appear that if a man desires to sell securities in the 
over-the-counter market on a part-time basis, he ought to be able to do so, 
provided he can comply with standards adequate to protect the public. In 
the remote areas of the country, a part-time salesmen could promote interest 
in stock investment. Such a salesman, however, should get no special privi-
leges because of his limited status. 
07 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963). 
DS Special Study pt. 1, at 91-92. 
09 See, e.g., NYSE RuLE 346. 
100 special Study pt. I, at 112. 
101 Id. at 161. 
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D. Conclusion 
The Special Study concluded that, with regard to standards and qualifi-
cations of personnel in the securities industry, the philosophy underlying 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 is outmoded. These acts were motivated by the belief that any person 
not guilty of particular acts of misconduct constituting statutory disqualifi. 
cation should be permitted to operate his own brokerage firm. The con-
tention of the Special Study, however, is that the tremendous growth and 
complexity of the securities industry102 requires that personnel satisfy 
standards of knowledge, experience, and training, and that securities firme 
demonstrate adequate financial responsibility. To accomplish this objective, 
both the Special Study and the Commission have recommended that all 
broker-dealer firms be compelled to become members of self-regulatory 
associations.103 Such a requirement would be a condition of the firm's 
registration with the SEC. Thus each group-put-and-call dealers, real 
estate securities firms, and mutual fund firms-might have its own self-
regulatory association. These associations would have the responsibility of 
enacting qualification standards. This proposal is an excellent recommenda-
tion, since it would likely engender enthusiastic response by the member 
firms in both the promulgation and the enforcement of standards. 
The associations must devise a comprehensive scheme of entrance re-
quirements designed to assure that personnel entering the securities in-
dustry are adequately trained. An examination with a core of basic securi-
ties subjects should be required of all securities salesmen. The examination 
should contain sections of increased difficulty and breadth for those with 
ownership and supervisory responsibilities. In particular, ethical considera-
tions should be stressed in the examination. The Special Study has proposed 
that at least one principal of each broker-dealer, and preferably every 
supervisor, be required to have experience in the industry. The associations 
could establish certain categories of work which would qualify as adequate 
experience. This would be particularly important when a firm recruits a 
supervisor from an outside organization. Also, the associations should re-
quire a six-month training period, prior to which a salesman could not sell 
to the public. In addition, the associations should establish a model train-
102 Although the number of member firms on the New York Stock Exchange has 
only increased from 586 firms in 1945 to 672 firms in 1962, the number of salesmen 
employed by exchange firms has risen from 7,989 at the end of 1945 to 32,555 at the 
end of 1962. Also, the number of branch offices has increased from 841 in 1945 to 2,737 
in 1962. Id. at 46. In particular, the Merrill Lynch firm, the nation's largest brokerage 
firm in terms of income, has increased the number of its salesmen from 1,038 in 1951 
to 2,054 in May 1962. Bache & Company has increased the number of its salesmen from 
100 in 1945 to 1,414 in 1962. Id. at 22. Likewise, the number of NASD members has 
more than doubled since 1945. In 1962 there were 4,771 firms, as compared with only 
2,372 in 1945. The number of registered representatives in the NASD has increased from 
24,843 in 1945 to 94,444 in 1962. The number of branch offices operated by NASD members 
has risen from 790 in 1945 to 4,713 in 1962. Id. at 36. 
10a Id. at 159. 
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ing program and maintain effective surveillance over the quality of the 
training programs of their member firms. The associations should also adopt 
an educational prerequisite for registered representatives. At the same time, 
however, it would seem that in appropriate cases an applicant with inade-
quate formal education should be able to qualify upon successful com-
pletion of the training program and a high mark of achievement on the 
examination. Member firms should certify the integrity of an applicant 
after a reasonably diligent search of his background. Local character com-
mittees could supervise both the firm's investigatory techniques and the 
general character standards for salesmen. Finally, a minimum capital re-
quirement should be adopted by the associations. Such a rule would elimi-
nate the marginal capital firms which are responsible for a large percentage 
of violations of the Commission's regulations. 
The eventual result of a comprehensive set of qualification standards 
enacted by the self-regulatory associations might well be the evolution of 
the securities industry into a profession. The broker-dealer might assume 
a professional status similar to that of the lawyer or physician. A profession 
has been defined as "a limited and clearly marked group of men who are 
trained by education and experience to perform certain functions better 
than their fellowmen."104 A profession is characterized by a clear demarca-
tion of functions. Thus the lawyer advises his client only as to applicable 
law. In a similar manner, the stockbroker should advise his customers 
concerning the relevant attributes of the securities under consideration. 
Another important aspect of a profession is that its members have been 
subjected to rigid entrance requirements. At the present time, outside of 
the NYSE, the entrance requirements for securities personnel have not 
reached a level characteristic of the professions. Thus the stockbroker is 
not presently regarded as a member of a profession. However, the self-
regulatory associations, by raising the qualification standards for entrance 
throughout the securities industry, could enable brokers and salesmen to 
attain a greater degree of professional discipline and public esteem. 
A profession is also characterized by the paramount responsibility of its 
members to the public. Professional men have a duty to society to prefer 
the social good and the welfare of the profession to individual economic 
objectives which might prejudice those goals. It is clear, however, that 
fraudulent practices are all too frequent in the securities industry today. 
Nevertheless, since the Special Study found that inexperienced principals 
are responsible for a large part of the more serious violations of the secur-
ities acts and regulations, it is reasonable to believe that, with better trained 
personnel, unlawful activity within brokerage firms might be sharply de-
creased. Finally, a most important attribute of a profession is the existence 
of professional organizations which formulate standards of ethical and busi-
ness conduct and have the power to exercise disciplinary control over the 
10~ TAEUSCH, PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (1926). 
700 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
actions of individual practitioners. This objective dictates greater authority 
for self-regulatory associations. 
The securities industry should adopt as a primary goal the achievement 
of public recognition of the stockbroker and his fellow workers as mem-
bers of a profession. Enlarged control by self-regulatory associations would 
be a major step in this direction. Self-regulation would also avoid the 
dangers involved in excessive direct government controls.105 The first step 
in this direction should be association enactment and enforcement of 
higher qualification standards for members of the securities industry who 
deal with the public. 
II. CORPORATE PUBUCITY 
The availability and dissemination of information concerning publicly 
held corporations has a significant impact on the volume traded and the 
market price of a corporation's securities.106 Under present law, required 
disclosures are limited by their failure effectively to reach the problems of 
"unofficial"107 corporate publicity after the issuance of securities, and the 
publicity problems arising from issuance. Thus, the finding of the Special 
Study that some corporate public relations departments and their financial 
public relations consultants have prepared and disseminated material con-
trary to the basic philosophy and purpose of full disclosure and protection 
of investors108 points up the need for new laws and policies to set a higher 
minimum level of required disclosure, encourage additional voluntary 
disclosure, and police the substantive merits of all corporate publicity. 
A. Prevailing Disclosure Requirements 
The prevailing requirements of corporate disclosure can be categorized 
in the following four groups: statutory disclosure arising from the issuance 
of new securities; statutory disclosure resulting after the issuance process is 
completed; requirements imposed on listed corporations by the stock ex-
changes; and requirements imposed on corporations the securities of which 
are included in the NASD's retail quotations for the over-the-counter 
market. The problems emanating from these requirements relate to defini-
tion of standards and effectuation of a meaningful enforcement procedure. 
On the other hand, the thrust of the Special Study's findings and recom-
mendations dealt with the areas where the need for regulation of corporate 
publicity had not been deemed necessary or proper in the past. Thus, in 
order to determine what additional regulation is warranted, one must first 
look at the existing requirements and evaluate their advantages and failings. 
105 Bowen, Business Management: A Profession1, 297 AM. ACAD. PoL. 8: Soc. ScL 
ANNALS 112, 117 (1955). 
10s spedal Study pt. 3, at 70. 
107 "Unofficial" publicity is all information disseminated about a corporation which 
is not required by statute, the SEC, or any group acting as a regulatory body. 
10s Id. at 2. 
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The statutory requirements of disclosure arising from the issuance of a 
new security stem from section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.109 Under 
section 5(c) it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make 
use of any means or instrument of interstate commerce or of the mails, to 
offer to sell or offer to buy a security, unless a registration statement has 
been filed with the Commission as to such security.110 The registration 
statement requires the inclusion of a wide range of significant factual in-
formation111 which, upon filing, must be made available to the public.112 
In addition to the registration statement, a prospectus containing the same 
information must be prepared by the corporation for distribution.113 Dur-
ing the period between filing and the effective date of a registration state-
ment, no written communication offering the security may be used, except 
an identifying statement or prospectus.114 After the effective date, sales 
publicity other than a prospectus may be used; however, for a forty-day 
period following the effective date or the commencement of the public 
offering, a prospectus must either precede or accompany all such public-
ity.1115 These detailed requirements assure a means whereby those inter-
ested may have information upon which to make investment decisions. 
However, several factors militate against the effectiveness of these require-
ments. One of these is that few people analyze or even read the prospectus. 
Also, difficulties arise with respect to the provision that no "offer" can be 
made prior to the effective date of registration. Little can be said about the 
human foible of failure to take advantage of the available information; 
however, clarification of the requirement that no "offer" be made prior to 
the effective date of registration is needed, as its ambiguity dampens the 
full effectiveness of the policy of full disclosure. Section 2(3) defines "offer to 
sell" as including every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an 
offer to buy, a security or an interest in a security for value.116 This defini-
tion of "offer to sell" is considerably broader than the common-law concept 
of an offer, and it has been so construed by the courts. The problem of 
whether there is a violation of this provision when publicity disseminated 
prior to registration concerns either the issue itself or the issuing corpora-
tion. While it is clear that a short press release announcing a quarterly 
dividend does not constitute an "offer," and that a full-fledged publicity 
campaign advertising the issue before filing is a violation, whether an 
activity between these extremes constitutes a violation rests solely on the 
facts of each particular case. 
109 Since all issues of securities offered publicly, by use of the mails, or by other 
interstate means, fall within the registration requirements, most new issues, including 
those not registered on an exchange, are included. Id. at 2-3. 
110 68 Stat. 684 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958). 
111 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958). 
112 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(d) (1958). 
113 68 Stat. 685 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958). 
114 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(l) (1958). 
ms 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l0) (1958). 
116 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1958). 
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To add some certainty to this area, the Commission, in 1954, published 
Release No. 3844,117 dealing with the publication of information prior to, 
or after the effective date of registration. The release set out a series of 
examples of corporate publicity surrounding issuance and stated the Com-
mission's opinion on each in the hope of clarifying the law in this area. In 
the first set of examples the Commission stated that both the distribution 
of a brochure through the underwriter-promoter and the dissemination of 
a series of press releases, in an attempt to awaken the public, are violations. 
Additionally, the Commission pointed out that violative publicity need not 
be aimed at the general public. Another example was an investment bank-
ing firm which was about to underwrite an issue of securities. Without 
being fully aware of the prospective underwriting, the research department 
prepared a brochure on tjie company in line with its customary policy of 
distributing reports to its clients concerning securities it had previously 
sold. The Commission concluded that the participation of this underwriting 
firm in the distribution would propound difficulties under section 5. This 
example illustrates some of the major problems of uncertainty in this area. 
First, is the knowledge of one department in a firm imputed to the re-
search department? Second, assuming no such imputation of knowledge, 
should the publication of a brochure containing typical financial informa-
tion be construed as a violation of the act when such publication is in 
accord with past patterns of publicizing the issuing company? Clearly, 
more than mere knowledge of the coming issue combined with an intent to 
publish is necessary, because the true intent of the firm may be to advise its 
clients rather than awaken interest to purchase the new securities. The final 
set of examples raised problems concerning speeches delivered by company 
officials. The Commission's position seems to be as follows: provided the 
speech has not been arranged in contemplation of a public offering, no 
objection should be made to its delivery; however, distribution of a printed 
copy of the speech is frowned upon, and a request might be made by the 
Commission that each member of the group who received a transcript also 
receive a prospectus. The Commission seems to be on very shaky ground in 
this area, because a printed version of a speech, with respect to the audience, 
certainly constitutes no more an "offer to sell" than does oral delivery. 
Moreover, it seems apparent-even when a printed speech reaches those 
not present at the delivery-that if the oral delivery was not an "offer," 
its printed counterpart cannot constitute an "offer" unless it is distributed 
later as part of a selling effort. 
To solve some of these problems, Edward N. Gadsby, then chairman of 
the Commission, made two speeches in 1958 in which he delineated the 
general test of what constitutes an "offer to sell."118 His suggested test 
117 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844, March 2, 1954. 
118 Gun Jumping Problems Under Section 5, 188 COMM. AND FIN. CHRoN. 2536 (1958): 
Current Problems Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Release N. !JBU, 
address by Edward N. Gadsby before the Central States Group of the Investment Bank-
ers Association. 
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weighs the circumstances surrounding a publication, the publication's 
content, the timing, to whom it was addressed or communicated, the pub-
lisher, the manner of its publication, and its over-all effect, all with the 
purpose of determining whether the release was a normal corporate pub-
lication or an attempt to condition the market. Although not in conflict 
with the case law nor different from other legal tests which attempt to treat 
each case separately on its facts, Gadsby's test is obviously indefinite. Its 
indefiniteness is detrimental because it results in a minimum of corporate 
publicity during the period preceding the issuance of securities. The lack 
of full disclosure, especially when manifested by the withholding of in-
formation, may influence the price of a corporation's stock, and is likely to 
result in undue advantage for insiders and pave the way for fraud. Thus, 
in order to achieve the goal of full, accurate disclosure, and to retain the 
force of section 5(c), a more definite test is needed, even though it might 
result in less flexibility. 
After the issuance of new securities has been completed, additional 
disclosures are required by the Securities Exchange Act. Section 12 requires 
all listed corporations to file a registration statement analogous to that re-
quired upon issuance.119 In addition, section 13120 and regulations pursuant 
thereto require that the information on record be kept up to date by 
annual reports which include such information as a certified balance sheet, 
a profit and loss statement, a listing of those who are the principal security 
holders, the remuneration of officers and directors, and the status of stock 
options exercised or outstanding.121 Furthermore, periodic reports of un-
usual events, such as changes in control, changes in asset distribution, the 
institution of material legal proceedings, and any matter which requires a 
vote of the security holders must be reported pursuant to Commission 
regulations.122 
Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act,123 dealing with proxies, also 
establishes disclosure requirements. By rules promulgated pursuant to that 
section, the Commission requires a filing of solicitation materials and pre-
scribes a waiting period. Although "solicitation" is defined very broadly,124 
its thrust and effect is very similar to the treatment of "offers to sell." Thus 
the Commission has taken the position that a prepared speech or release 
for inclusion in general news media is proxy solociting material if it is 
110 68 Stat. 686 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1958). 
120 48 Stat. 908 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958). 
121 Form 10-K-Regulations pursuant to § 13 of the Securities Act. 
122 Form 8-K-Regulations pursuant to § 13 of the Securities Act. Also, short forms 
of uncertified profit and loss and earned surplus statements are required semi-annually. 
Form 9-K. Some real estate companies must report statements of profit and loss, cash 
flow, and cash distributions to shareholders on a quarterly basis. Form 7-K. 
123 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1958). 
124 "(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a 
form of proxy; (ii) Any request to execute or not execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or 
(iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under 
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revo-
cation of a proxy." Rule 14a-l. 17 C.F.R. § 240.Ha-l(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
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intended to condition public opinion and the opinion of stockholders 
favorably to the publishers of the material.125 The key seems to be an intent 
to align public opinion to the solicitor's cause. Despite the absence of an 
articulated test of what elements constitute a "solicitation," it is likely that 
the Commission's test applied to publicity consituting an "offer to sell" is 
a sound analogy for the conservative attorney to follow in advising clients. 
The net effect of the "disclosure requirements" after issuance, with the 
limited exception of proxy solicitation rules, is significant; but their full 
effectiveness is curtailed because they are in general limited to those securi-
ties registered on national exchanges, and by the fact that the disclosure 
requirements do not prohibit the corporation from disseminating incon-
sistent information.120 
The stock exchanges themselves encourage, and in many instances re-
quire, the disclosure of information about corporations listed on their 
exchanges. The New York and American Stock Exchanges both require 
prompt disclosure of any developments which might affect security values 
or influence investment decisions of stockholders or the investing public,121 
and encourage the telling of all phases of the corporation's story through 
advertising and other means in all of the available news media. The basis 
for requiring these prompt disclosures is to prevent insiders from obtaining 
any advantage by acquiring information before it is available to the pub-
lic.128 Accordingly, the NYSE has a stock-watching program to seek out and 
detect any unusual activity or rumors about a corporation or its securities. 
Upon discovery of such activity, the Exchange will usually urge full dis-
closure or, in the extreme, suspend trading until the market for the stock 
is stabilized.129 Both the exchanges require all listed companies to issue 
annually to their shareholders independently audited financial statements. 
Furthermore, these same statements must be submitted to the statistical 
services, the newspapers, and the wire services.130 The NYSE also requires 
listed corporations to solicit proxies for all shareholders' meetings, and the 
AMEX is in the process of adopting this same policy.131 The Midwest and 
Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges have analogous prompt disclosure provisions 
requiring the reporting of all dividend news. They also investigate a listed 
company when unusual activity occurs in its stock,132 and require corpora-
tions to send their shareholders independently audited statements.183 How-
ever, neither the Midwest nor the Pacific Exchange has any formal policy 
concerning the distribution of other corporate news by listed companies. 
125 SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943). 
120 See special Study pt. 3, at 89-90. 
127 N.Y. Stock Exchange, Company Manual A20-22; Special Study pt. !I, at 98. 
128 Special Study pt. 3, at 98. 
129 Id. at 97-98. 
130 Id. at 5. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Id. at 98-99. 
133 Id. at 5. 
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The disclosure provisions of the exchanges encourage the availability 
and dissemination of corporate publicity; however, there is no meaningful 
policy regarding the substantive content of such publicity. The view is 
that, since an exchange is normally unable to determine the accuracy of 
corporate publicity at the time it is issued, an attempt to do so at a later 
time would be second guessing the company.184 Furthermore, the prompt 
disclosure requirements prevent a company from giving out information 
on a "hold for release" basis.135 Thus, the opportunity for financial re-
porters to make independent investigations which might lead to unbiased 
articles is virtually eliminated, leaving editors with the choice of accepting 
the release substantially as it comes from the corporation or of foregoing 
the dissemination of such information.136 It seems clear, then, that the 
interaction of the prompt disclosure requirements with both the strict rule 
against "offers to sell" prior to the effective date of registration on a new 
stock issue, and the solicitation provisions for proxies, present the possibility 
that inconsistent duties may be imposed on the corporation. 
The final group of disclosure requirements is that promulgated by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers. Since 1962, corporations included 
in the national and regional quotation lists of the NASD have been re-
quired to make prompt disclosure to the press of any corporate develop-
ment which may affect the value of the companies' securities or have an 
influential effect on an investor's decision to buy or sell.137 These new re-
quirements, although subject to the same limitations as the prompt dis-
closure requirements of the exchanges, serve the important purpose of 
bringing a substantial segment of the publicly held corporations under some 
form of duty to disclose. 
Although there exists a significant amount of information flow due to 
the existing requirements of disclosure, it is apparent that there are defects 
in the scope of the system. Elimination of these defects and the formulation 
of a coordinated, comprehensive plan for the comprehensive and effective 
disclosure of all valid substantive information concerning publicly held 
corporations is certainly in order. 
B. The Study's Findings of Abuse and Potential Abuse of Corporate 
Publicity 
The Special Study indicated that some of the corporate publicity dis-
seminated over the past years has been inaccurate and misleading, and that 
these abuses have become increasingly frequent.138 Some of the more B.a-
184 Id. at 99. 
135 A bulletin distributed on a "hold for release" basis provides a time interval in 
which those receiving it may investigate its merit. 
186 See id. at 98. 
187 Id. at 99. 
188 Id. at 65. The Special Study based its findings on an intensive study of the fi. 
nancial public relations activities of forty-six companies which were sent questionnaires, 
and on an extensive examination of "five of these companies whose activities stood out 
as demonstrating cunent or emerging problems." 
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grant abuses stem from the activities of financial public relations consul-
tants. As an illustration of methods used in the financial public relations 
industry, the Study set forth a detailed publicity proposal submitted by 
such a consultant to the General Development Corporation, a Florida land 
developing company the common stock of which is traded on the American 
Stock Exchange. The suggested publicity campaign was divided into four 
parts, covering company relations with the investment community, the 
financial press, its stock.holders, and the general public. In furtherance of 
these relations, the primary devices suggested were "field trips" to Florida 
for executives of influential investment firms, security analysts, and invest-
ment advisers; dinners and luncheons with investment and securities men 
coupled with speaking engagements before investment and analyst associa-
tions; frequent press releases based on advanced timing considerations; a 
letter giving figures on company progress "disguised as a news item"; the 
publication of a monthly or quarterly shareholder's magazine or news-
letter; and a series of "corporate image" advertisements in The Wall Street 
Journal, Business Week, Barron's and other news magazines.139 Obviously, 
all of these suggested recommendations could be used in a manner which 
would preclude the proliferation of inaccurate or misleading information; 
however, the Special Study found that entertainment, field trips, and 
luncheons are an important part of the financial public relations budget,HO 
and that speaking engagements, especially before such groups as the New 
York Society of Security Analysts, are a prime goal of the public relations 
agent.141 These findings lead one to believe that there is a likelihood that 
the information disseminated as a result of this type of publicity program 
will be based on undue influence rather than objective, factual reporting. 
This seems especially true when the "field trips" are to properties located 
in Florida or other desirable places of recreation. Indeed, the lesson which 
can be drawn from these promotion suggestions is that if corporations must 
spend significant sums of money and exert a considerable amount of 
energy in order to tell their stories, many will come to feel that such activity 
should produce immediate beneficial results.142 
The preparation of material for the use of security analysts is another 
area where financial public relations activities may result in the dissemina-
tion of incorrect and misleading information. This is especially true in 
cases where it is the public relations man who writes the final version of 
189 Id. at 78-81. 
140 Id. at 85. 
141 Id. at 83. 
142 The Study reported that in 1961 the General Development Corporation invited 
twenty-one analysts to its Florida properties. The trip lasted over four days, including 
one day at the company's country club. "Of the 18 brokerage houses represented on 
these junkets, 5 issued market letters favorable to the company within 3 months • • • 
and 6 others indicated approval in internal communications. In addition, an investment 
advisory service recommended the stock and a large foundation which was represented 
on the trip purchased a large block of convertible debentures." Id. at 86. 
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material to be sent to investors over the name of investment advisers.148 
For instance, one firm regularly prepares a report for its corporate clients 
emphasizing favorable information which many times includes highly opti-
mistic predictions. It then provides many brokerage firms with copies of 
these reports complete with the latter firms' names printed thereon so that 
they can distribute "tout sheets" to their customers at no expense.144 Al-
though these reports do carry a notation stating their origin, the print is 
generally small enough for many customers to be misled into thinking that 
the brokerage house is responsible for them.145 
If the attitude of the financial public relations consultant were that of 
an unbiased third party whose job was only to take basic data from the 
corporation and make it available to the public via the media of inforina-
tion dissemination, the danger that much of said information may. be 
incorrect or misleading would be greatly reduced. This, however, is not 
the case. The attitude of the financial public relations consultant can be 
most likened to that of a salesman of its client's stock.146 This is evidenced 
by the advertisements which consultants use in attempting to secure cor-
porations as clients.147 When the totality of the publicity disseminated is 
prepared and distributed by those who appear to be unbiased but who are 
actually salesmen with the natural tendency to "puff" concerning their 
wares-avoiding the bad points and overstating the good points-the detri-
mental effects of reliance thereon is readily apparent.148 Some companies 
compensate these consultants with options to purchase the company's 
stock.149 The Study specifically stated that this practice does not necessarily 
imply manipulation of the stock's price for personal gain or any analogous 
improper intent on the part of the parties, but does suggest that, since 
the consultant has no obligation to disclose his financial interest, those who 
accept the publicity releases may not be aware that the information they 
receive comes from an interested source under a situation in which conflict 
of interest may produce a prejudiced result.11i0 
143 Id. at 80-81. 
144 Ibid. 
145 The Dewitt Conklin reports had the following statement printed in small type: 
"This report is released and distributed for and on behalf of the company in the in-
terest of developing closer relations among the company, its stockholders and the finan-
cial community. The information contained and any opinions expressed in this report 
arc solely those of the Management of the Company." Id. at 81. 
146 "Whatever words are used, little doubt remains that their purpose is to increase 
stock prices. Indeed some financial public relations men concede that they are salesmen 
of their client's stock." Id. at 71. 
H7 A large portion of such advertising lauds the prowess of the public relations firm 
in placing articles in the press and having close contacts with security analysts and 
advisers. Id. at 81. 
us The reliability of the publicity, even if the financial public relations consultant 
is not acting as a salesman, is also subject to question, because the consultant usually 
acts as a conduit between the corporation and the public without checking the validity 
of the information. Id. at 86-87. 
149 Id. at 68-69. 
150 Id. at 69-70. 
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Another abuse is the use of publicity by one in control of a corporation 
to further his own personal goals. The study cites, as one of the most 
flagrant abuses of publicity by a corporate insider to influence stock. prices, 
the case of SEC v. Louis E. W olfson,151 which concerned an attempt to 
depress the price of American Motors Corporation common stock. in order 
to cover a large short position. In this incident, Wolfson's financial con-
sultant told a financial reporter that Wolfson and members of his family 
were in the process of liquidating some seven percent of the outstand-
ing stock. of American Motors. An article quoting the consultant, which 
appeared shortly thereafter, had the effect of depressing the stock. price, 
whereupon Wolfson was able to cover a substantial portion of his short 
position.152 Fortunately, the Commission was able almost immediately to 
obtain an injunction requiring Wolfson to disclose the true facts and delay-
ing him from further covering his short position. Although most publicity 
does not include falsified information and is generally not incorrect or mis-
leading, this by no means mitigates the problems of insider dealings.153 
The snowballing effect-the rapid enlarging of a story at each repetition 
-which occurs when an influential publication carries information about 
a corporation, increases the detrimental reliance of the public on incorrect 
or misleading information, because the placing of only one item can 
achieve a totally unrealistic reaction.154 The possibility that the public 
may rely to its detriment occurs even when the facts promulgated are 
correct, because the presence of a barrage of information tends to excite 
the public and cause price increases, even though the substance of the 
information, if presented alone, would not have the same effect. Thus, by 
an adroitly placed bit of news, a corporation can cause substantial fluctua-
tions in the price of a given security. This effect was clearly illustrated in 
the Report by the example of how Joseph Purtell, the senior editor in charge 
of the business-news section of Time magazine, was able to make substantial 
gains by simply purchasing shares of a corporation shortly before an article 
on the company was due to appear.155 In one specific instance, a 350 per-
cent price increase occurred in a period of less than a month, during which 
rumors that Time was going to publish an article were circulated and the 
article appeared. A questionnaire circulated by the Study showed that a 
very large portion of those who purchased shares during the rise were 
prompted to do so by the magazine article.156 Although this example is not 
151 Civil File No. 135•30, S.D.N.Y. 
152 Special Study pt. 3, at 72-73. 
158 See id. at 71. 
154 These are inherent limits to the effectiveness of such activity because an infor• 
mation source can only remain respected when the information it disseminates holds 
true or, "like the boy who cried 'wolf' [it] will end up being ignored." Id. at 76. 
155 Joseph Purtell is no longer associated with Time magazine. Id. at 72-73. 
156 Id. at 20. The price of Technical Animations, Inc. Class "B" common stock rose 
from $4 to $13.75 between April 10, 1961, and April 27, 1961. Id. at 73, 75. A more 
recent example of the effect a strategically placed magazine article can have on the price 
of a stock of a corporation is that of Barnes Engineering Corp., reported in Newsweek, 
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an instance of abuse of publicity by a corporation, it does emphasize an 
area in which corporate management should feel some duty to the public. 
I£ a corporation has any part in the initiation or promulgation of a scheme 
whereby individuals will gain personally from a snowballing effect, it should 
be subject to sanctions. Even if the corporation is an innocent bystander-
especially when incorrect information about its activities or financial data 
is being put forth-it should feel ethically bound to see that this informa-
tion is corrected by taking all reasonable steps under the circumstances. 
The significance of the snowballing effect is also evident in the area of 
over-enthusiastic or premature publicity concerning new product develop-
ments or sales and earnings estimates.157 The Study set forth an instance 
involving the Fairbanks Whitney Corporation in which the company re-
ported that it would soon obtain new pre-eminence in its field by virtue 
of a practical desalinization technique. This report received wide publicity 
in such respected magazines as Fortune, Look, and Newsweek, as well as The 
Wall Street I ournal and other newspapers. Furthermore, the company was 
mentioned in the advisory material of several prestigious brokerage houses. 
Unfortunately for those who purchased in reliance on the publicity, the 
predictions failed to materialize.158 Even if the company made the an-
nouncements in good faith and acted accordingly ever since, it was un-
doubtedly the initial cause in a chain of events which produced a mislead-
ing and inaccurate picture upon which some of the advisory services and, 
more important, the public relied. Thus, management should not only 
exercise caution and restraint in the release of such material, but should 
feel a duty once an erroneous impression has been created to see that it is 
corrected. 
These areas cited by the Report should not be considered abuses in the 
sense of unlawful acts which merely require the strengthening of sanctions 
now in existence. Rather, they should be thought of as problem areas 
Oct. 14, 1963, pp. 96-98. It is noted therein that "What turned out to be as wild a stock 
buying spree as the Street had seen since the glamour-issue days of 1959-61 was a direct 
reaction to an article in the Saturday Evening Post. The thermograph, said the Post, 
'promises to save lives by detecting the hot infra red glow thrown off by deadly ailments, 
including cancer.' " Stock in the Barnes firm was selling for under $18 when the Post 
article appeared and added $10 in a single day. The American Stock Exchange stopped 
trading because the orders could not be matched. After a day off the board it was put 
back on and the price went up to $44. Again trading was held up; orders continued to 
pour in and the tick.er flashed "PRESENT INDICATIONS 50-55 ..• WILL NOT OPEN 
TODAY." However, trading never did open, and the president of the American Stock 
Exchange suspended the stock indefinitely because the stock's activity "reflected a con-
fused situation." One week after the appearance of the Post article, with the Amex 
suspension, Barnes gravitated to the over-the-counter market, where the stock's price 
dropped to $28. 
157 See Special Study pt. 3, at 20. 
158 The Fairbanks Whitney Corporation announced that it would soon have a com-
mercial disalinization plant in operation. It also announced completion of the first mass-
production unit, and promised to announce plans for a world wide marketing process. 
Presently, two years after such predictions, the fulfillment is still wanting due to "tech-
nical delays." Id. at 91-92. 
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where unethical practices can occur which might well be declared unlawful, 
but which due to a present lack of statutory framework remain unpunish-
able. Thus, they emphasize the need for new legislation and policies which 
can act not only as guide-lines for higher standards of conduct, but as 
mechanisms for the enforcement of such conduct. 
C. Correction of Abuses and Potential Abuses of Corporate Publicity 
The presence of inaccurate and misleading information, although its 
incidence be infrequent and its proliferation unintentional, has the effect 
of presenting an unreal picture upon which the investing public may rely 
to its detriment. Recognizing that there exist today numerous areas of abuse 
or potential abuse, a scheme to encourage the development of accurate 
and complete dissemination of corporation publicity is needed. 
In order to evaluate the merit of any specific corporate publicity activ-
ity, one must keep in mind the possible underlying motivations for such 
publicity. In any given instance, the primary purpose of the corporation's 
use of publicity may be to sell the corporation's products, to increase its 
prestige with the financial community in order to borrow capital readily, 
to increase the price of its stock in order to facilitate financing by the 
issuance of additional shares, to enable present shareholders to realize a 
gain, or to proliferate the corporate name because of the egoism of a high 
corporation officer.159 Most, if not all, of these reasons for the dissemination 
of information can lead to beneficial results by making available, as a basis 
for sound investment decisions, information about a publicly traded cor-
poration. Abuses will arise when the net effect of publicity, due to any 
motivation, results in information which creates erroneous impressions. If 
the reason for the flow of publicity is the presentation of a product within a 
normal advertising campaign, we might accept a deleterious effect in order 
not to hamper corporate activities aimed at bona fide commercial purposes, 
although the same effect might not be so palatable if the goal were merely 
personal gain or egoism. Thus, not only must the net effect of the public-
ity be considered, but the practical justifications, if any, for such a conse-
quence should be weighed. In addition to the motivation factor, the cause 
of and responsibility for the misleading publicity must be evaluated. 
In developing a standard for regulating the dissemination of factually 
incorrect information, one must start from the premise that ideally all 
such information should be curtailed. However, the application of a strict 
standard prohibiting the dissemination of all incorrect information would, 
in effect, require every organization which accepts any information from a 
corporation to research it thoroughly before passing it on. This stringent 
burden of research seems so restrictive that it would probably result in a 
great depletion in the number of financial public relations consultants and 
thus lead to a curtailing of the reliable voluntary corporate publicity now 
~159 Id. at 78. 
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being disseminated.160 Since the application of strict liability to financial 
public relations consultants is not desirable, a flexible standard for regulat-
ing the dissemination of incorrect information by them is needed, one 
which will hold them accountable for disseminating any incorrect informa-
tion they knew or should have known about. On the other hand, the im-
position of strict liability on the corporate source, although it might like-
wise decrease the flow of voluntary publicity, seems desirable, because any 
false publicity disseminated by a corporation about itself is best suppressed. 
Thus a financial public relations firm would receive treatment different 
from that of a division of a corporation performing the same function. How-
ever, under a flexible standard, those firms closely associated with the cor-
poration could be subjected to a greater degree of care than those firms 
acting at arm's length vis-a-vis the corporation. This should make the 
difference between the treatment accorded a corporate division and a private 
firm which has an equal opportunity to corroborate the publicity it dissemi-
nates, almost minimal.161 
It seems that the problem of defining the standard to be applied is 
most difficult in the area of dissemination of incomplete information. 
Here, if one wishes to bring up questions of degree he meets the almost 
unsolvable problem of "sales talk" vis-a-vis actual omission of material 
facts. Another difficult question is whether a publicity release is complete 
when it mentions only a new development of the corporation, without 
placing it in the setting of the industry and the economy as a whole. In 
this area also there must be a flexible standard, weighing all of the cir-
cumstances, if any type of meaningful regulation is to occur. Such flexibility 
is necessary because the numerous fact situations which can arise would be 
impossible to cover in any single piece of legislation. 
The matter of saturation publicity raises questions of propriety as well 
as of degree. Saturation publicity is intensive, simultaneous coverage of a 
development in all available news media. Although such publicity is com-
plete and accurate, its mere presence may cause a change in stock prices 
from what would be the uninfluenced normal pattern. The basic question 
here is whether a public market should be affected by extensive, albeit 
accurate publicity, when the aim may be to condition the market for 
financial activities. The statutory treatment of "offers to sell" prior to issu-
ance and proxy solicitations answers this question in the negative by 
regulating publicity which might condition the market. By analogy, one 
might reason that all conditioning of the market is bad. However, in 
100 Since many corporations seem to consider the use of financial public relations 
firms a "luxury," curbing such expenditures when budgets must be cut, the increased 
cost of supporting thorough research would probably be enough to curtail a significant 
portion of the information normally distributed in this manner. See id. at 67. 
161 If account is not taken of a financial public relations consultant's ability to cor-
roborate its publicity releases, a premium would be placed on the splitting off of a 
corporate division in order to avoid the automatic sanction if the information it dis-
seminates is incorrect. 
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furtherance of bringing forth as much corporate information as possible, 
it seems best that regulation be limited to the areas of "offers to sell" prior 
to issuance, proxy solicitation, and, hopefully, manipulations for personal 
gain which do not have a foundation in furtherance of a corporate business 
purpose. This result seems best when one considers the constitutionally 
protected right of freedom of speech. Although it seems clear that the 
present regulations and any suggested regulations curbing manipulative or 
misleading practices would not fall within constitutional proscriptions,102 
the desire to regulate must always be weighed against the goal of our 
society for freedom of activity and speech whenever possible. 
The type of enforcement mechanism most suitable for the policing of 
these solutions must also be considered. Although the law has not been 
specifically concerned with "unofficial" corporate publicity, there are nu-
merous statutory regulations designed to curb manipulative and fraudulent 
activties of professionals in the securities markets; these suggest some possi-
ble answers. 
The provision most applicable to curbing abuses of corporate publicity 
is Rule IOb-5, promulgated under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act. Section IO(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
to make any untrue statement in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security, or to make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not 
misleading.163 Despite judicial holdings that IOb-5 gives a private remedy 
to investors without the presence of privity of contract between the plain-
tiff and defendant, the applicability of the rule to fraudulent corporate 
publicity is limited by the requirement that the information be dissemi-
nated in connection with a purchase or sale of the security.164 Furthermore, 
the effectiveness of the rule is limited by the uncertainity of the extent of 
liability for unintentional misrepresentation and the degree of reliance on 
the defendant's misrepresentations by the plaintiff.165 
Many states have also attempted to regulate false and fraudulent prac-
tices; however, the extent and effectiveness of these statutes has been 
limited by strict construction and failure of prosecution. Thus, although 
the Martin Act166 in New York, for example, does contain provisions 
broader than the federal acts, the Study pointed out that only one case was 
reported during the recent bull market, and there the court limited the 
act's application to purchases through the misrepresenting party.167 
The only self-regulatory body in the financial public relations industry 
162 Problems might arise if sanctions were imposed for the dissemination of correct 
information simply because it fell in an area where there have been a few practices 
which could be classified as unethical. 
163 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1958). 
164 See 3 Loss 1767-71 for a general discussion of this area. 
165 See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W:O, 
Ky. 1960). 
166 Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw, art. 23A. 
167 Special Study pt. 3, at 97. 
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is the Public Relations Society of America. This organization includes over 
4,000 practitioners and encompasses many leading financial publicists; it 
has a meaningful Code of Professional Ethics.168 However, its policing has 
thus far involved only disputes concerning fees or clients. Despite this 
dearth of effective self-regulation, it would be most desirable if this associa-
tion were to become an effective force so that direct government control 
would not be necessary. 
These various provisions and modes of curbing manipulative and fraud-
ulent activities suggest the possibility of an extension or liberalizing of their 
provisions in order to cover the full range of abuses and potential abuses 
of corporate publicity. Although this seems to be a fertile ground for con-
structive action, this will not suffice to effectuate all of the desirable correc-
tive changes needed in this area. Therefore, a regulation and enforcement 
program analogous to those existing under the labor and antitrust laws 
should be considered. Not only do these areas provide a framework for tlie 
policing by a federal agency of adherence to objective standards, but they 
also exhibit systems wherein both private causes of action and govern-
ment injunctive powers can be accommodated. Furthermore, they provide 
examples of methods whereby the corporation and its officers can be sub-
jected to both civil and criminal sanctions when necessary. 
D. Recommendations of the Special Study 
The Special Study concluded that prevention of abuses in the dissemi-
nation of information concerning publicly held corporations is not entirely 
within the realm of legal control, due to the large volume of corporate 
publicity, the paramount aim of full and prompt disclosure, the difficulty 
of making judgments concerning specific items of publicity, and the 
proximity of the field to the constitutional right of freedom of expression.169 
However, in its three specific recommendations it did suggest certain 
statutory actions, along with other remedies.170 The first recommendation 
was that the stock exchanges and the NASD establish a set of high 
standards for the dissemination of corporate publicity, to which the corpora-
tions the securities of which they list or quote would be required to conform. 
These could take the form of statements of policy covering the types of 
disclosure and publicity required or expected, and the types that should be 
discouraged or excluded under certain circumstances. The second recom-
mendation was that consideration be given the enactment of a statute 
providing criminal sanctions and civil liability for intentional or reckless 
dissemination of false and misleading statements, including forecasts un-
168 The Code of Ethics includes the following prohibitions: (1) A member is not to 
engage in any practice which tends to corrupt the integrity of channels of public com-
munication; (2) A member is not intentionally to disseminate false or misleading infor-
mation and is obligated to use ordinary care to avoid dissemination of false or misleading 
information. Id. at 99. 
169 Id. at 102. 
110 Ibid. 
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warranted by existing circumstances which might reasonably be expected to 
affect transactions in the issuer's securities. The third recommendation was 
that the rules requiring disclosure under the securities acts be revised to 
require disclosure of material facts concerning the compensation paid or 
payable to any financial public relations consultant in the form of any 
equity of the issuer. 
Although the Study's recommendations are significant, they fail to advo-
cate the necessary statutory reform needed to correct the problem shown to 
exist. This is especially true with regard to the second recommendation, 
which suggested only that a statute be "considered." If the Study's recom-
mendations are to manifest themselves in genuinely effective reforms, a 
force speaking with stronger conviction as to the need for new statutory 
enactments will have to appear. 
E. Conclusion 
The Study, in dealing with the practice of paying public relations 
advisers in equity securities of the issuer, recommended that all such pay-
ments be disclosed in the corporation's registration statements, offering 
circulars, proxy statements, and subsequent reports. There is no question 
that disclosure is an effective way of dealing with this problem; however, 
the mere reporting that a financial public relations consultant has been 
compensated in the equity securities of its employer does not seem sufficient. 
The recommendation fails to deal with those abuses which are fostered by 
the large expenditures on entertainment and "field trips" made by a num-
ber of corporations. Short of complete prohibition, the best way to eliminate 
excessive expenditures is to require that such expenditures be fully re-
ported. Furthermore, in order to make these required disclosures more 
effective, it seems wise to require that all the data included in the registra-
tion statement, offering circulars, proxy statements, and subsequent reports 
be distributed to the corporation's shareholders at least once a year. This 
would not only bring these new disclosures to light and facilitate the dis-
semination of the other information included; it would also eliminate the 
resultant misleading of innocent shareholders carried on by some corpora-
tions which distribute to their shareholders information different in import 
from that required to be furnished to the Commission. 
Another recommendation of the Study deals with the general problem 
of creating applicable standards for the dissemination of corporate public-
ity. The Study's suggestion was that the stock exchanges and the NASD 
can accomplish significant results by establishing high standards to which 
companies over which they have some control would have to conform. Once 
again, there is no question as to the wisdom of the recommendation. It 
seems judicious to urge the independent associations and exchanges to 
provide as much as possible of the needed regulation themselves, since it 
minimizes the cost of administration and, more important, produces less 
friction and avoids creating depressing effects on the market. Despite these 
advantages of self-regulation, it is questionable whether promulgation of 
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high standards alone would be sufficient, unless accompanied by a change 
in the exchanges' attitude toward the policing of the substantive sufficiency 
of disclosures. This is true because one of the major weaknesses of the 
present regulation carried on by these groups is their failure to concern 
themselves with the substance of corporate disclosures. These failures of 
self-regulation, while not sufficient to outweigh the value of autonomous 
action by the exchanges, demonstrate that self-regulation itself is not suf-
ficient to curb all abuses of corporate publicity. Nevertheless, strict enforce-
ment by the Public Relations Society of America of its Code of Professional 
Standards for the Practice of Public Relations should be encouraged. Action 
of this nature is the form of self-regulation which one might hope would 
render unnecessary the enactment and enforcement of regulatory legisla-
tion.11011 
The remaining recommendation of the Study also dealt with the appli-
cable standards for the dissemination of corporate publicity; however, the 
Study limited the thrust of this suggestion for a statutory solution by 
advising merely that consideration be given to it, rather than advocating 
that immediate action be taken, as with its other two recommendations. 
Furthermore, the Study limited its suggestion for criminal sanctions and 
civil liability to intentional or reckless actions. Unfortunately, the failure 
to state that statutory action is necessary implies a belief that the other two 
suggestions can alleviate the primary abusive practices in corporate pub-
licity. 
If civil liability is limited to intentional or reckless actions, the short-
comings of the laws covering manipulations and fraud, which fail effectively 
to reach the corporation or its agents, still remain. Thus, it seems that this 
final recommendation should have advocated positive action. It also should 
have been wider in scope so as to provide a solution to the problems of 
when a corporation is under a duty to come forward and disclose, what 
remedies are available when violations occur, and who should have the 
right to enforce the remedies. 
The answers to these problems of corporate publicity are not easily 
found; however, it seems that there exist in the regulation of proxies and 
in national labor and antitrust legislation fertile analogies which could be 
adopted and used effectively in the regulation of corporate publicity. The 
Commission, if given power to exercise a prompt form of injunctive relief, 
would be able to curb many abuses; moreover, if it had the power to re-
quire positive disclosures, it could curb nonfeasance as well as misfeasance. 
The basis for action such as this would have to be a general authorization 
of power encompassing the duty to see that no false or misleading impres-
sions are created which could affect the prices of the securities of a publicly 
held corporation. The problem of investigating such matters would be ac-
complished most efficiently if private individuals and the exchanges, in 
addition to the Commission, were empowered to file complaints. These 
170a Concerning a new financial code of the Public Relations Society of America, see 
New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 9, 1964, p. 31. 
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complaints could then be handled before an administrative tribunal subject 
to judicial review. The major accomplishment of such a system would be 
its ability to provide adequate remedies. Private causes of action could be 
brought for damages as well as injunctive relief, without the limitations 
inherent in the laws designed to prevent manipulation and fraud; the 
Commission could also obtain quick equitable relief. 
Finally, although this problem is covered in other areas of the Special 
Study,171 it seems imperative that the post-issuance disclosure requirements 
not be limited to securities listed on the national exchanges, but also apply 
to certain securities traded in the over-the-counter market. The oppor-
tunity to mislead the public exists in both markets. 
III. INVESTMENT ADVICE 
When an investor asks the question, "What stock should I buy?" there 
are many people who will give him an answer, ranging from fly-by-night 
"tipsheet" publishers to highly competent personal investment counselors. 
Some will give him the answer gratis, but with the hope that when he does 
buy he will avail himself of their brokerage services. From others, the advice 
will be forthcoming for the price of a subscription fee. If the investor 
prefers personalized service, and his investment capital is sufficient to 
qualify him for such benefits, the fee for advice will be based on a per-
centage of the money invested.172 There are still other advisers who will not 
wait for the potential investor to pose his inquiry; rather, they expound 
their views regarding investment, for public consumption, in newspapers, 
magazines, and books. All these persons are referred to generally as "invest-
ment advisers." Still, the list would not be complete without the addition 
of a large and indefinable group composed of lawyers, accountants, insur-
ance companies, banks, and all others who may be in a position to convey 
investment advice.173 Taken as a whole, the advice thus disseminated has 
great influence on the private investor and, in turn, on the entire securities 
market. It is the purpose of this section to point out the significant prob-
lems presented by the continual flow of investment information, to discuss 
the legal and ethical responsibilities of the advisers, to evaluate present 
controls in the area, and to offer some suggestions as to improved solutions 
to the problems presented. 
171 Id. at 1-64. 
172 Personal investment advice and management tends to be out of the price range 
of the average investor. For instance, Lehman Brothers limits its investment advisory 
service to clients with $400,000 or more to invest. Generally, the fee for personal invest-
ment advice amounts to one half of one percent of the money invested. See MAYER, 
WA.IL STREET: MEN AND MoNEY 195 (2d ed. 1959). 
173 Although a well-placed magazine or newspaper obviously can affect the price of 
a stock, recommendations of this kind have far less effect on the investing public 
than the recommendations of those in the business of disseminating investment advice. 
See Special Study pt. 1, at 332. The material below will be directed toward analysis of 
the problems stemming from the activity of the latter group. 
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The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was passed as Title II of the bill 
of which Title I was the Investment Company Act.174 Its passage followed 
a report on investment advisers in which the Commission described the 
growth of the investment advisory business and pointed out the more ob-
vious problems involved in it.1711 The significant portions of the act required 
registration of investment advisers with the Commission; prohibited fraud 
or deceit in dealings with a client or prospective client; forbade investment 
advisory contracts providing for compensation to the adviser on the basis 
of capital gains from, or appreciation of, securities purchased; prohibited 
assignment of advisory contracts by the adviser without the consent of the 
party advised; and required that the adviser give full disclosure when sell-
ing or purchasing securities for a client while at the same time acting on 
the other side of the transaction as principal for his own account or agent 
for one other than the client.176 The term "investment adviser" as defined 
in section 202(a)(II) of the act means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through pub-
lications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and 
as a part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports 
concerning securities.177 "Investment adviser" does not include: (a) a bank 
or holding company affiliate which is not an investment company; (b) a 
lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services 
is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (c) a broker-dealer 
whose performance of such services is incidental to the conduct of his 
business and who receives no compensation therefor; (d) publishers of 
newspapers, news magazines, and business and financial publications of 
regular and general circulation; (e) those persons whose advice is confined 
to obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States; 
and (f) any other persons so designated by the Commission.178 The follow-
ing investment advisers are exempted from the registration requirements 
of the act: (1) an investment adviser whose clients are residents of the state 
of his business, and who does not furnish advice with respect to any 
security traded on a national exchange; (2) an investment adviser whose 
only clients are investment companies and insurance companies; and (3) 
an investment adviser who in the preceding twelve months had less than 
11• 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). 
1711 SEC, INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, 
AND INVESTMENT .ADVISORY SERVICES {1939). 
176 Investment Advisers Act §§ 203, 205-08, 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80b-3, 80b-5 to -8 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). 
177 Investment Advisers Act § 202{a){ll), 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1958). 
178 Ibid. 
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fifteen clients and did not hold himself out to the public as an investment 
adviser.179 
Professor Loss has deemed the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 "little 
more than a continuing census of the Nation's investment advisers in this • 
country."180 This observation is substantiated by the fact that proceedings 
under the act sin.ce its promulgation in 1940 have averaged one or two per 
year,181 and that these actions have been largely confined to the most 
blatant types of fraud.182 The deficiencies in the act have not gone un-
noticed by the Commission. As early as 1945 the Commission formally 
urged improvement of the act.183 Prior to the passage of the bill amending 
the act in 1960, a congressional committee noted that, of the five acts ad-
ministered by the Commission, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was by 
far the least adequate to meet the problems it was supposed to solve.184 
In fact, the amendments to the act were the only part of the Commission's 
legislative program which, at that time, was supported without dissent in 
the industry.185 
The 1960 amendments gave the Commission additional grounds for 
denial of registration to an applicant.186 In order to facilitate adequate in-
vestigation of potential registrants, the Commission was given the power 
to postpone the effectiveness of the initial registration.187 Previously, the 
Commission was required to decide within thirty days whether to approve 
the application for registration.188 Moreover, with respect to advisers al-
ready registered under the act, the Commission can now suspend registra-
tion for a period not to exceed twelve months.189 Prior to 1960 the only 
disciplinary tool possessed by the Commission was outright revocation of 
registration.190 Of course, an unregistered adviser is for all practical pur-
110 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1958). 
180 2 Loss 1393. 
181 Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 248 (1959). 
182 For instance, in the fiscal year 1961 there were two proceedings brought by the 
Commission under the act. In one, the registration of an investment adviser who solicited 
and accepted money for subscriptions to an investment letter, but did not publish it, was 
revoked. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 108, Oct. 4, 1960. In the other, the 
Commission revoked the registration of an investment adviser who had simultaneously 
violated the fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963), and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 54 Stat. 
852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. IV, 1963), relating to perpetration of 
fraud on a client. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 109, Oct. 31, 1960. 
183 SEC, PROTECTION OF CLIENTS SECURlTIES AND FUNDS IN THE CUSTODY OF INVEST!\IBNT 
ADVISERS (1945). 
184 S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
185 Ibid. 
186 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b· 
3(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
187 Investment Advisers Act § 203(e), 54 Stat. 851 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
188 54 Stat. 851 (1940). 
189 Investment Advisers Act § 203(d), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-3(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
190 54 Stat. 851 (1940). 
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poses out of business, as he is permitted to use neither the mails nor any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his advisory 
business.191 It is apparent that the harshness of the revocation penalty pre-
cluded disciplinary action by the Commission in instances in which a 
penalty of some lesser degree would have been appropriate.192 The Com-
mission now has the power to require the keeping of books and records,193 
and to require the filing of reports by investment advisers.194 A comple-
mentary provision forbids public disclosure of information obtained by the 
Commission in examination or investigation, except in the case of public 
hearings or upon request by Congress.195 In short, the Commission staff is 
placed under a duty of nondisclosure similar to that of a bank examiner. 
By far the most important provision of the 1960 amendments is that em-
powering the Commission to define "fraudulent, deceptive, and manipula-
tive" practices and to prescribe by rules means reasonably designed to 
prevent them.196 The wording of this section is almost identical to section 
15(c)(2) of the Exchange Act, which relates to broker-dealers.197 
With the passage of the 1960 amendments to the Investment Advisers 
Act, only two of the major proposals concerning investment advisers sug-
gested by the Commission since 1945 remain unenacted: an amendment to 
section 205 of the act, requiring advisory contracts of registered advisers to 
be in writing, and the addition of a section prohibiting a registered adviser 
from having custody of his client's securities or funds unless his registration 
application discloses that he had or might have such custody.198 Consider-
ing the revelations of the Special Study,199 it is doubtful that either of these 
proposals will receive sufficient attention to become law. It is apparent that 
far more prevalent and serious deficiencies exist in other areas of investor 
protection. Furthermore, it appears that the Commission, through the use 
of its new rule-making power, has provided sufficient protection for an 
investor whose securities and funds are in the hands of an investment 
adviser. 
To date, the Commission has issued three sets of regulations pursuant 
to the rule-making power given it by the 1960 amendments. First, the Com-
101 Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1958). 
102 For instance, two advisers were permitted to remain in business although the firm 
they controlled had been found guilty of taking secret profits at customers' expense and 
of willfully falsifying its registration statement. H. Evan Taylor, 26 S.E.C. 637 (1947). 
103 Investment Advisers Act § 204, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 
(Supp. IV, 1963). 
104 Ibid. 
105 Investment Advisers Act § 210, 54 Stat. 854 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10 
(Supp. IV, 1963). There are no similar nondisclosure provisions relating to investigations 
under other acts administered by the Commission. 
100 Investment Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 
(Supp. IV, 1963). 
107 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1958). 
108 See SEC, PROTECTION OF CLIENTS SECURITIES AND FUNDS IN THE CUSTODY OF INVEST-
MENT ADVISERS (1945). 
100 See generally Special Study pt. 1, at 330-479. 
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mission has formulated an extensive list of records which must be kept by 
every investment adviser.200 These include: memoranda setting forth the 
details of any transaction or instruction relating to the sale or purchase of 
any security; bills or statements relating to the business of the investment 
adviser; and originals of communications received and sent with regard to 
recommendations or advice proposed or made, exchanges of securities, and 
buy and sell orders. Second, the Commission has promulgated rulings deal-
ing with advertisements by investment advisors.201 Any testimonial relating 
to the adviser is prohibited. Reference to past recommendations which 
would have proved profitable is likewise prohibited. The adviser, however, 
may list his recommendations within one year of the advertisement if there 
is printed on the first page of the advertisement, the following words: "It 
should not be assumed that the recommendations made in the future will 
be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities in this list." 
The regulation also provides, in effect, that there can be no claim that a 
chart or graph will predict the future of a stock. Third, the Commission 
has promulgated rules concerning the adviser's possession of his clients 
funds or securities. It is deemed a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative 
practice for any investment adviser to take action with regard to his client's 
funds or securities unless the adviser (1) segregates, identifies, and holds 
such funds or securities in a reasonably safe place; (2) deposits all funds in 
a bank account or accounts containing only the client's funds, maintained 
in the name of the adviser as agent or trustee, and keeps adequate records 
of such accounts; (3) gives notice to the client of the location of the funds 
and securities; (4) sends each such client an itemized statement at least every 
three months showing the funds or securities in the adviser's custody, and 
all debits, credits, and transactions affecting the client's account during such 
period; and (5) provides for verification of funds and securities of the client 
by an independent public accountant, without notice to the adviser, at 
least once a year.202 However, this regulation does not apply to an invest-
ment adviser also registered as a broker-dealer under section 15 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the broker-dealer is in compliance with 
or exempt from section 15c(3)(1).2os 
The impact of the new regulations is readily apparent. Since the three 
sets of rules were promulgated, the registrations of investment advisers 
have been revoked in eight cases, and three proceedings have been instituted 
to revoke the registrations of others.204 The regulations have opened the door 
200 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (Cum. Supp. 1962). 
201 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (Cum. Supp. 1962). 
202 27 Fed. Reg. 2150 (March 6, 1962). 
203 Ibid. The regulation of investment advice given by broker-dealers is given further 
attention in section IV infra. 
204 Revocations: SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 153, Nov. 26, 1963 Gustin 
Stone & Associates, Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 148, Sept. 4, 1963 
(Dynamics Letter, Inc.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 134, Dec. 31, 1962 
(J. H. Logan & Co.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 130, Oct. 4, 1962 (Seymour 
J. Schlesinger); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 128, June 20, 1962 (Carroll Till-
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to aggressive policing of investment advisers-a course not available before 
1960. For instance, in the proceeding which resulted in the revocation of 
the registrations of Carroll Tillman and Francis Ryan,205 doing business as 
the Tillman Survey, the Commission charged that Tillman, aided and 
abetted by Ryan, published and distributed advertising material which 
contained untrue statements and which was false and misleading. Among 
other infractions, the misrepresentations in the advertisements consisted of 
comparisons between the securities recommended by Tillman and other 
securities, without adequate disclosure of the material differences between 
the securities, and representations that a list of ten stocks presented was 
selected in accordance with seven tests prescribed by Tillman, which tests 
could allegedly uncover enormously profitable securities. 
2. State Regulation 
State regulation of investment advisers is a comparatively recent devel-
opment, although there is a noticeable trend in this direction.206 In 1958, 
sixteen states required the registration of investment advisers;207 by 1962, 
the number had risen to twenty-five.208 However, according to a survey of 
the twenty-five states requiring adviser registration, in only sixteen can the 
security commission or other appropriate officer deny registration to those 
applicants he considers unqualified.209 Thus, in a little over one-fourth of 
the states requiring registration, it is but a mere formality. 
The relevant provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, adopted by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956, 
are integrated with similar provisions relating to broker-dealers. Section 
102 of the Uniform Act, dealing with investment advice, is analogous to 
the Investment Advisers Act, as amended in 1960. Unlike the federal 
statute, however, the Uniform Act requires that the investment advisory 
contract be at least in part in writing.210 The Uniform Act also gives the 
administrator the power to deny, suspend, or revoke an application for 
registration if he feels the applicant or registrant is not qualified on the 
basis of such factors as training, experience, and knowledge of the securities 
man and Francis Ryan); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 127, June 12, 1962 
(Anne Casely Robin, doing business as The Profit Maker); SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 129, June 9, 1962 (Owen K. Taylor, Inc., Edward Blatt, Walter Rosenbusch, 
and Financial Forecasters, Inc.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 126, June 5, 
1962 (William H. Biesel). The following proceedings were instituted under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act to determine whether the registrations of certain investment advisers 
should be revoked: SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 151, Oct. 30, 1963 (Spear 
&: Staff, Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 144, May 8, 1963 (Paul K. Peers, 
Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 139, March 25, 1963 (Market Values, Inc.). 
205 Investment Advisers Act Release No. 128, June 20, 1962 (ordering the revocation 
of the registrations of Carroll Tillman and Francis Ryan). 
206 See Loss &: CowEIT, BLUE SKY LAW 20-21 (1958). 
201 Ibid. 
20s 1 Loss 47. 
209 Id. at 48-49. 
210 UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 102(b). 
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business.211 In contrast, there are no provisions in the federal act allowing 
the Commission to deny or revoke a registration due to lack of ability of 
the adviser. Moreover, the Uniform Act provides that the administrator 
may require a minimum capital figure for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.212 To date, the Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in fifteen 
states and is expected to become law in several others.21a 
3. Self-Regulation 
Private associations of investment advisers play a minimal role in self-
regulation. Presently, there are two such groups organized on a nation-wide 
basis. The Investment Counsel Association of America (ICAA) is an or-
ganization of fifty-four firms "primarily engaged in the giving of continu-
ous advice as to the investment of funds of clients on the basis of the 
individual needs of each client."214 The Institute of Chartered Financial 
Analysts was formed in 1959 with the objective of fostering higher educa-
tional standards in the field of financial analysis by conducting examina-
tions designed to test individual competence and skill. The Institute grants 
the designation of "chartered financial analyst" to persons who meet the 
standards established by the Institute for the professional practice of 
financial analysis.215 The Special Study noted that both the Institute and 
the ICAA have embarked on a course aimed ultimately at "achieving pro-
fessional recognition, much in the manner of accountants, whose drive for 
recognition started at the end of the nineteenth century."216 Although it 
would seem that such a program might indirectly lead to a general raising 
of industry standards, the Study reported that the present program seems 
to hold only limited benefits for the public, as the immediate result will be 
confined to the conferring of an industry cachet upon certain analysts.217 
The small size of these organizations, the absence of substantial sanctions 
against their members, and the present focus on "status" rather than con-
trol of industry practices, all combine to render their effect de minimis. 
The New York Stock Exchange has established certain guideposts for 
advisory material disseminated by member firms. It suggests that supporting 
information be offered with respect to recommendations relating to the 
sale or purchase of securities; that forecasts of future performance be clearly 
labeled as opinion; and that flamboyant language and misleading com-
parisons be avoided.218 The NYSE has also suggested that a member organi-
211 Id. § 204{b)(6). 
212 Id. § 202(d). 
213 Special Study pt. 1, at 82. The following states have adopted the Uniform Securities 
Act: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and ·washington. 
214 !CAA by-laws art. 1, § 1, as quoted in Special Study pt. 1, at 149. It is obvious that 
this association encompasses a very small percentage of the 1,836 advisers registered 
under the Investment Advisers Act. 
215 special Study pL 1, at 149. 
216 Id. at 150. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Quoted in Special Study pt. 1, at 376-77. 
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zation recommending a security in which it has a position should consider 
whether such an interest ought not to be stated in the material. The Special 
Study, however, reported that if most firms "consider" including a state-
ment of their position, the results of such consideration "appear almost 
universally to be negative."219 Furthermore, the Study reported that most 
firms pay little heed to any of the afore-mentioned guideposts.220 The NYSE 
also has a program for review of market letters and sales literature, which 
is reported to be "considerably short of vigorous and aggressive self-regula-
tion."221 Similarly, the NASD has certain general restrictions on advice 
published by broker-dealers, the enforcement of which is equally uninspir-
ing.222 Since few advisory firms are engaged in selling, advisers are for the 
most part beyond the compass of the NYSE and NASD rules. 
B. Present Problems and Recommended Solutions 
Aside from the problems relating to the qualifications of investment 
advisers, the Special Study indicated that, from the point of view of pro-
tection of the average investor, the present major deficiencies in the opera--
tion of advisers relate to (I) the widespread practice of "scalping," i.e., the 
adviser has a position in a particular stock, recommends investor action in 
that stock, and after market response to his recommendation, sells or buys 
accordingly, reaping gains from the market action that he has generated; 
(2) the problem of "snowballing" recommendations, i.e., an adviser recom-
mends a stock in his publication, whereupon another writing his market 
letter on the basis of the first recommends the same stock even more 
vigorously, and so on; (3) inadequate research practices; and (4) the pre-
dominant orientation toward "buy" recommendations-both in broker-
dealer literature and that disseminated by the subscription services. 
At the time the Report of the Special Study was published, it was doubt-
ful whether the practice of scalping was in fact proscribed by the Invest-
210 Id. at 377. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Id. at 379. In response to criticism by the Report of the Special Study, the NYSE 
recently issued an expanded set of rules governing member firms' market letters, research 
reports, and other communications with the investor. Among the more significant of the 
new rules are the following: (1) a tighter requirement that member firms recommending 
securities in market letters disclose their own dealings in the issues; (2) a provision requiring 
that member firm claims that they are equipped to provide research facilities have a reason-
able basis; (3) a requirement that reports and recommendations prepared by someone other 
than the brokerage firm (such as a company's public relations agent) identify the source; 
(4) a requirement that brokerage firms' internal wires and market letters conform to the 
rules for market letters shown to the public; and (5) a requirement that a firm's recom-
mendation to buy or sell a stock have a basis which can be substantiated as reasonable. 
These new rules were reported in The Wall Street J., Sept. 25, 1963, p. 9, col. 2. One must 
remember, however, that the Special Study's criticism was directed toward the lack of 
enforcement of exchange rules rather than the lack of rules; thus, whether the present 
action of the NYSE is indicative of a policy that will in fact meet the objections of the 
Special Study remains to be seen. 
222 See Comment, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827 (1962). 
724 MICHIGAN LAW REvmw [Vol. 62 
ment Advisers Act. However, in the recent case of SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.223 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
practice of "scalping" is in fact a form of fraud or deceit on the client and 
as such within the practices forbidden by the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940. In five instances Capital Gains had acquired a position in certain 
issues and then recommended that its customers purchase the same securities, 
each time without disclosing its position in the market or its intention to 
sell. It then sold the securities it held at a considerable profit. 
In investigating the problem of scalping, the Study found no consistent 
attitude on the part of advisory firms toward the propriety of recommend-
ing securities in which the firm is disposing of its position, or toward the 
necessity of disclosing that it has a position.224 Some firms stated that they 
will not solicit purchases by their public customers of a security in which 
they are liquidating an investment position, while others will not prepare 
a market letter or research report on such a security.225 On the other hand, 
many firms do not disclose their position in the securities which they 
recommend, and some even ask their adviser-salesmen to "crank up on it 
as . . . very attractive" when they are trying to "unload."226 The Special 
Study recommended, with respect to advisers and broker-dealers subject to 
self-regulatory organizations, that thorough statements of policy standards 
be established requiring disclosure of existing positions in written invest-
ment advice.227 With regard to those not subject to self-regulation, the 
Study recommended organization into self-regulatory bodies, or alterna-
tively that the Commission extend and strengthen its own regulatory mea-
sures,228 with the same objectives in mind. However, it would seem futile 
to hope for the emergence of a self-regulatory body or bodies in the near 
future, as the investment advisory business has flourished since the end of 
World War I with no significant move in this direction. Furthermore, the 
wide variations of opinion on the part of those in the field with respect to 
ethical standards would certainly make it difficult for such a body to form 
a meaningful set of rules. Disclosure of the adviser's position seems definite-
ly preferable to a total prohibition from taking a position, as an advisory-
_broker-dealer firm may legitimately want to build up a position in a stock 
which it is about to recommend, in order to have shares available for its 
223 84 Sup. Ct. 275 (1963). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had refused to 
find Capital Gains guilty of wrongdoing under the fraud section of the Investment 
Advisers Act, stating that, at most, the defendant merely profited personally from the 
predictable effect of its investment advice; however, there was a vigorous dissenting 
opinion, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), 61 MICH. 
L. REv. 1185 (1963). 
224 special Study pt. 1, at 371. 
225 Id. at 371-73. 
220 Ibid. 
227 Id. at 386. 
22s Id. at 387. 
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customers at a price which will not reflect the market impact of its recom-
mendation. A disclosure rule promulgafed by the Commission would seem 
the most appropriate remedy. Specifically, under section 206(4) of the 
Investment Advisers Act, as amended in 1960,229 the Commission should 
define nondisclosure of one's position as deceptive or manipulative and 
require full disclosure of the adviser's position in any security which he 
recommends. 
The matter of "snowballing" recommendations is but one aspect of a 
more general problem relating to inadequate research. If there were ade-
quate research departments in all of the advisory firms who claim to have 
them, recommendations could in fact be based on the firm's independent 
evaluation of each company with which it deals, and there would be no 
need for "cribbing" and using other advisory letters for source material. 
The Dunn Engineering case,280 reported in detail by the Special Study, 
presents a graphic illustration of the disastrous effects of this phenomenon. 
In this case, a chain reaction of various market letters, each based at least 
in part on a previous letter, resulted in the enthusiastic recommendation 
of Dunn Engineering by broker-dealers and subscription publishers within 
a few weeks of its bankruptcy, long after the appearance of obvious signs 
that the company was in bad trouble. 
The Special Study reported several examples of wholly inadequate re-
searching of recommended securities.281 Most unfortunate was the finding 
that "frequently there is a broad gap between the practices followed and 
the standards professed to the public."282 The most significant shortcoming 
with respect to advice disseminated by broker-dealers is that research staffs 
are often so burdened with preparing internal publications, answering in-
dividual inquiries, providing portfolio reviews, and working on special 
advisory services for institutional investors that there is insufficient time 
to devote to material for investors generally.233 The prime shortcoming 
of subscription publication research is that the publications attempt to 
cover far more securities than their staffs can adequately evaluate.234 The 
brunt of inadequate research, in the form of ill-prepared market letters 
and tout sheets of broker-dealers, is borne by the small investor; it was he 
who was hardest hit in the 1962 downturn of the market.235 Institutional 
220 That section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly 
••• (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, 
or manipulative. The Commission shall for the purpose of this paragraph (4) by rules 
and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts, 
practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Invest-
ment Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. IV, 
1963). 
2so Special Study pt. 1, at 334-44. 
231 Id. at 351-53. 
282 Id. at 350. 
288 Ibid. 
284 Id. at 363-67. 
285 U.S. News &: World Report, Oct. 1, 1962, pp. 56-59. 
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investors generally pay for and receive priority treatment with regard to 
research skill and investment advice.236 The Special Study has recommended 
that reckless dissemination of investment advice by broker-dealers and 
investment advisers be expressly prohibited by statute or rules of the 
Commission and the self-regulatory agencies. The most adequate remedy 
would be Commission rules prohibiting reckless dissemination of investment 
advice. The Commission has the authority to promulgate such rules by 
virtue of its power under both the Exchange Act and the Investment 
Advisers Act to prohibit "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices.23611 
A market letter or report appearing or stated to be the product of research 
when in fact it is not is obviously "deceptive." It is apparent that the 
Commission, by a broad interpretation of the fraud section of the Securities 
Exchange Act, is attempting to protect the investor from similarly deceptive 
representations coming from broker-dealers in connection with the offer 
and sale of securities. For instance, in the case of Brown, Barton, and 
Engel237 the Commission suspended the broker-dealer registration in ques-
tion on the basis of sections IO(b) and 15(c)(l) of the Securities Exchange 
Act.238 The respondent had made false and misleading representations with 
respect to future prices, listings, and availability of certain stock. Addi-
tionally, he failed to make a diligent and reasonable investigation of the 
issuer before recommending the stock. The Commission felt that suspension 
of the registration was necessary in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of investors. 
The detrimental effect of unreliable investment advice is the same 
whether attendant to an offer to sell securities or part of a market report of 
an investment adviser; in either case, the investor is led to act on representa-
tions purportedly the product of an accurate evaluation, when in fact no 
such evaluation has taken place. The rules suggested would effectuate the 
degree of investor protection toward which the Commission was striving 
in the Brown case, but at the same time would expand its compass to in-
clude all advice disseminated by both broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers. The flexibility of the rules is both desirable and necessary. Aside 
from the fact that definite standards would be hard to formulate, flexible 
rules would be more in keeping with the fact that informal, behind-the-
scenes conferences play a significant part in Commission supervision, and 
236 Special Study pt. 1, at 357. 
286a Exchange Act § 15(c)(2), 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958); Investment 
Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b·6 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
237 Brown, Barton &: Engel, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6821, June 
8, 1962. 
238 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). The 
composite effect of these provisions and the rules enacted thereunder is to make unlawful 
the use of the mails or the facilities of interstate commerce in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security by means of a scheme to defraud, any untrue or misleading 
statement of a material fact, or any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon customers, or by means of any other manip• 
ulative, deceptive, or fraudulent device. 
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would allow the Commission to draw upon its experience in enforcing the 
analogous general fraud section of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Whether restrained and dignified or exuberant and flamboyant, whether 
distributed by broker-dealers or advisers, the tone of most investment advice 
points to one course of action: BUY.239 This fact would not be disturb-
ing in itself if it were not coupled with a great difference of opinion in 
the securities industry as to the extent of a firm's obligation to make the 
recipients of its published advice aware of significant changes in the cir-
cumstances of a company whose security it has recommended.240 Although 
one firm reporting to the Special Study group suggested that there may 
be a moral obligation to follow up recommendations and give periodic re-
ports until a sell recommendation is made, most firms indicated that no 
organized effort is made to follow up on stock favorably recommended.241 
There are several reasons why advisory firms don't want to give "sell" 
advice. First, such advice can result in refusal by management of the 
issuer of the "unrecommended" security to continue as a source of infor-
mation for the adviser. A few firms feel that problems would be created 
by customers who might receive the advice late.242 Most important, the 
ominous possibility of losing underwriting business as a result of manage-
ment's adverse reaction is ever-present for firms who do underwriting as 
well as disseminate investment advice. Nevertheless, these rationalizations 
do not compensate for the fact that, in purporting to act for the investor 
in giving advice concerning the investor's portfolio, the investment adviser 
has assumed a position tantamount to, if not actually that of a fiduciary. 
Logic, as well as reasonable business morality, dictates that "sell" recom-
mendations be forthcoming when the market so warrants. A call for legis-
lation or regulation would not seem to be the answer to this deficiency, 
for innumerable problems, including those presented by the first amend-
ment, would result from an attempt to formulate a regulation in any way 
delineating the substantive content of securities literature. In this light, it 
seems that the best "remedy" for the problem is cultivation of public 
awareness of the prevailing orientation toward "buy" recommendations. 
The report of the Special Study is in itself a step in the right direction. 
Once the investing public is aware of the fact that the prime concern of 
advisers is to sell securities, there should be far less misplaced reliance on 
the judgment of advisers. 
A significant problem tangentially related to a discussion of investment 
advisers per se is that of unreasonable and collusively set advisory fees paid 
by mutual funds to investment advisers. Although this problem was not 
dealt with by the Special Study, it has been the subject of several recent 
cases litigated under the Investment Company Act. The following pattern 
2so Special Study pt. I, at 344-50. 
240 Id. at 348. 
241 Ibid. 
242 special Study pt. I, at 348. 
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is usually present in these cases. The directors of the adviser are also the 
directors of the fund and are therefore able to fix the fees in the interest 
of the adviser rather than the fund. Thus the resultant advisory fee bears 
no relation to the reasonable value of the services rendered; and although 
there are poor results, the advisory contract is consistently renewed.243 
The Investment Company Act has adequate standards to gauge the fidu-
ciary conduct of those directors of mutual funds who play such a dual role, 
and the Commission has the power to step in.244 The question presented 
in the recent cases, however, relates to whether a mutual fund or share-
holder thereof suing for breach of fiduciary duty has a private right of 
action by virtue of the Investment Company Act. An affirmative answer 
would supply much needed uniformity in the field. Without such a pri-
vate right of action, a plaintiff is left to his common-law remedy, which of 
course depends on the laws of the various states. The federal courts are 
presently split on the question. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, refusing to hold that a private remedy stems by implication from the 
Investment Company Act, has indicated that in a private action the di-
rectors of a mutual fund are to be held to their common-law duty of due 
care, rather than the fiduciary standards articulated in the act-with re-
spect to advisory fees or otherwise.245 On the other hand, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has allowed a private right of action based on the 
alleged violation of eight different sections of the Investment Company 
Act, in which the plaintiffs sought to have the advisory contracts declared 
null and void, and to have the individual defendants repay the excessive 
advisory fees.246 In the course of its opinion, the Court expressly rejected 
the Eighth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of the Investment Company 
Act. 
Because the Investment Advisers Act was until 1960 a weaker regulatory 
device than the Investment Company Act, the Securities Act, and the Ex-
change Act, there are no reported cases in which a plaintiff has success-
fully recovered damages from an adviser by virtue of its provisions. The 
aggrieved investor's chances may be somewhat better since the act was 
strengthened by the 1960 amendments. Nevertheless, because most federal 
courts which have implied liability from the other federal securities acts 
have required buyer-seller privity247-a condition almost always lacking in 
a suit against an investment adviser-it seems that plaintiffs will remain 
dependent upon the common-law remedy: an action for deceit. Still, 
the possibility of a civil remedy for a plaintiff aggrieved by an investment 
243 For a general discussion of this problem, see Comment, Private Rights of Action 
Under the Investment Company Act, 1961 DuKE L.J. 421. 
244 See generally Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). 
245 Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 
369 U.S. 424 (1962). 
246 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). 
247 Comment, supra note 222, at 837. 
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adviser should not be completely foreclosed. It is settled that an action 
for damages can be based on the Securities Exchange Act, which makes it 
unlawful to use a manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.248 Similar language was added to the Invest-
ment Advisers Act in 1960, and if one regards the investment adviser as 
a fiduciary, the fiduciary relationship should compensate for the lack of 
buyer-seller privity, at least in cases where the investor has paid for per-
sonal service or a subscription publication. The Special Study recom-
mended that, by statute or rule, the reckless dissemination of investment 
advice be expressly made subject to civil liability in favor of customers 
reasonably relying thereon to their detriment.249 However, this recom-
mendation seems premature. The enactment of such a rule should await 
an authoritative ruling from a federal court to the effect that a civil lia-
bility cannot be implied from the Investment Advisers Act, as amended in 
1960. Moreover, from the point of view of the general public, the Com-
mission would be better off for the time being concentrating its efforts 
in the direction of adequate control to prevent deceptive practices from 
occurring at all. 
C. Conclusion 
Insofar as there is to be state regulation and/or registration of invest-
ment advisers, it should be part of the general state Blue Sky law and not 
be made the subject of separate legislation. There are several advantages of 
integrated Blue Sky legislation. If all aspects of legislation dealing with 
broker-dealers and investment advisers were part of a single legislative 
enactment, rather than piecemeal statutory rules, the adoption of uniform 
legislation among the states would be facilitated. Clear legislative state-
ments of state policy would aid federal-state coordination in developing 
this area of the law. Furthermore, within each state, requirements of dual 
registration when a person is both a broker-dealer and an investment ad-
viser would be eliminated, and economy and consistency in the adminis-
tration of securities laws would be enhanced by a single set of provisions 
relating to rule-making, investigation, enforcement, and analogous pro-
cedures. But, on the whole, state action seems inadequate to cope with 
the problems presented by the investment adviser segment of the securities 
industry. The flow of advisory material is obviously interstate, and investor 
material of general circulation from a single source will reach most of the 
states. Most important, however, is the fact that the United States has a 
direct interest in maintaining the integrity of the securities markets, which 
play a vital role in the national economy. 
On a nationwide basis, the assumption of more responsibility by exist-
ing self-regulatory organizations, the formation of self-regulatory organiza-
tions where there are none, the promulgation of regulations requiring 
248 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). 
240 Special Study pt. I, at 387. 
730 MICHIGAN LAW REvmw [Vol. 62 
disclosure of the adviser's position in securities he recommends, the pro-
hibition of reckless dissemination of investment information, and provision 
for a civil remedy for those hurt by reckless advice would provide more 
adequate protection for the investor. Yet, more than this seems to be re-
quired to raise the investment advice business to a high ethical plane and 
the level of professional competence it often professes to embody. Those 
in the advisory field will have to decide whether they are salesmen ped-
dling their commodity-investment advice-for whatever it is worth, or 
professional men willing to assume a fiduciary responsibility in the selec-
tion and supervision of suitable investment portfolios. Only the latter 
answer will fully protect the investor from the undesirable results of the 
present predominant orientation of advisory material toward "buy" rec-
ommendations-a problem that seemingly cannot be solved by legislation 
or regulation. Whatever the results of the Special Study in the way of 
immediate legislation or rules, it seems that its most significant accomplish-
ment in this sphere of the securities industry is that it has publicly posed 
the basic questions, and thereby set the stage for comprehensive govern-
ment control of the field if the industry itself does not provide adequate 
solutions. 
IV. SELLING PRACTICES 
No examination of present-day selling practices in the securities indus-
try can be limited merely to coverage of the Special Study findings and 
recommendations. In the area of selling practices, far more than in the 
three preceding sections, the courts and particularly the Commission itself 
have on their own initiative recently instituted sweeping and sometimes 
dramatic changes. Many of these alterations in the level of professional 
integrity required of the broker-dealer have transpired within recent 
months. The Special Study recommendations must be viewed in the light 
of these developments. Thus this section will devote as much attention to 
recent proceedings in the courts and the Commission as to the Study itself. 
The merchandising of securities is a multimillion dollar industry which 
has come to play an integral part in the American economy.250 The num-
ber of individuals owning shares in publicly held corporations in 1962 was 
estimated to be about 17,010,000, an increase of approximately 4,500,000 
since 1959.251 This rapid growth has been largely the result of an increased 
emphasis on sales techniques; and, because of his direct contact with the 
public, the activity of the securities salesman is critical to the sales effort.252 
The intangible nature of securities and the intricacies of the securities 
business as a whole present formidable obstacles to knowledgeable invest-
250 The market value of the shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange alone in 
1962 was $47 billion. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1963 FACT BOOK I (8th ed. April, 1963). 
251 Of these 17,010,000 persons, 6,666,000 had household incomes under $7,500, and 
the adult female shareholders outnumbered the adult male shareholders by 326,000. Ibid. 
252 special Study pt. 1, at 250. 
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ment. As a result, the public must ordinarily rely heavily upon the advice 
and recommendation of the securities salesman, regardless of whether the 
salesman acts as agent or principal in the sale. Such reliance sets the stage 
for great potentialities for fraud, and it has been observed that "the busi-
ness of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for dishonesty 
are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages acute, active minds, 
trained to quick apprehension, decision, and action.''253 The laws govern-
ing selling practices attempt to resolve the conflict between policies favor-
ing traditional arm's-length transactions protected by the doctrine of caveat 
emptor, and the realities of public investment-a dependent relationship 
lacking many of the safeguards of the bargaining process. 
A distinction between a securities broker and a securities dealer has 
developed as a part of the law of selling practices. Traditionally, their 
functions were separate, with the broker selling and buying as agent "for" 
his customer, and the dealer, acting as a principal, selling "to" and buying 
"from" his customer. With the advent of federal securities regulation, the 
functions of broker and dealer received separate legislative treatment, 
although the courts had previously recognized these distinctions and had 
employed certain differentiating characteristics to distinguish the dealer 
from the agent.254 The Securities Act of 1933 included within the definition 
of dealer those who perform the functions of a broker,255 but the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 distinguished between the two, defining a broker as 
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities 
for the account of others,"256 and a dealer as "any person engaged in the 
business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a 
broker or otherwise ... :•251 
The inconsistency inherent in a situation where the same firm or in-
dividual acts as both agent and principal has long been recognized. Never-
theless, the practice of combining these functions is prevalent throughout 
the securities industry, and almost universal in the over-the-counter market. 
In a 1936 report of the Securities and Exchange Commission it was stated 
258 Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943). 
254 See Douglas &: Bates, Stock "Brokers" As Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46 
(1933). "Other courts have recognized ••• distinctions and in general have employed the 
following differentiating characteristics or earmarks to distinguish the dealer from the 
agent. 
"(l) The form of the confirmation 'sold to you' rather than 'bought for your account' 
is evidentiary of a dealer-customer relationship. 
"(2) The fact that the customer is not charged any commission is likewise evidence 
that the 'broker' acted as dealer. 
"(3) The 'broker' when acting as a dealer usually acquires the stock at one price and 
transfers it to the customer at another. 
"(4) If the 'broker' is selling from his inventory he is acting as a dealer. 
"(5) He is nonetheless a dealer even though he had no inventory but was acquiring 
securities for his customer in the manner of any merchant." Id. at 60-61. 
255 Section 2(12), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l2) (1958). 
256 Section 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1958). 
257 Section 3(a)(5), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1958). 
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that the combination of the broker and dealer functions in the same indi-
vidual or firm involves a conflict of interest provocative of abuse of the 
fiduciary relationship inherent in the brokerage function.258 It was found, 
however, that separation of the functions was so often economically un-
feasible in smaller communities that the solution for this conflict was not 
to divorce the functions, but to control conflicts of interest by a strong 
administrative program of inspection and control.259 One result of the 
program undertaken by the Commission subsequent to this report has been 
the virtual elimination of the distinction between broker and dealer, ac-
complished by application of a standard of fair dealing to all sales prac-
tices. Furthermore, the distinction between broker and dealer may now 
be illusory, since it is doubtful that the word "dealer" conveys the idea of 
an arm's-length relationship to the average customer or even to the trade.200 
This is true because of the broad definition used in the Securities Act, and 
because an agent may have a declared interest adverse to that of his prin-
cipal in the very transaction to which the agency relates.261 Whatever the 
reasons, distinctions between the two are generally ignored in the area of 
selling practices; and the Commission has adopted the inclusive designa-
tion "broker-dealer."202 
The investor gains some protection against fraudulent selling practices 
of broker-dealers by virtue of the remedies provided by traditional common-
law actions, such as deceit and rescission. Further protection has been 
found in an implied civil cause of action based on the Exchange Act of 
1934.263 The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities acts, violation of 
which may subject a broker or dealer to civil, criminal, and administrative 
sanctions imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, provide 
specific protection for the investor. Finally, the national exchanges and 
the NASD have their own disciplinary proceedings designed to deal with 
fraudulent selling practices. 
The material below examines the law as it exists today governing the 
fraudulent selling of securities,264 the sanctions available against violators, 
the remedies available to a defrauded investor, and findings and conclu-
sions of the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets. 
258 SEC, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF 
THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 109 (1936). 
259 Id. at 110-13. 
260 See generally Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers 
in Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1237, 1248 n.45 (1946). 
261 REsrATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 23, 24, 389, 390 (1958). 
262 See generally 2 Loss, 1215-23; 3 id. at 1500-08. Hereinafter the functions will be 
treated as combined, unless otherwise indicated. 
263 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
264 Excluded from this examination are those activities which do not involve direct 
contact with the public, e.g., odd-lot houses, specialists, floor-traders, and pure wholesale 
dealers. 
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A. Laws Governing the Fraudulent Selling of Securities 
Prior to 1933, the federal government could combat fraudulent selling 
practices only by bringing criminal charges under the mail fraud statute.265 
The Securities Act of 1933, however, embodied a general provision de-
claring fraudulent practices unlawful when connected with the offer or 
sale of any security.266 This provision, section 17(a), has provided the 
basic language for all subsequent antifraud provisions: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly 
or indirectly-(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement 
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any 
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."267 
The Exchange Act of 1934 included section IO(b), which made unlawful 
use of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of Commission rules" in the purchase or sale of any security whether 
registered on a national securities exchange or not.268 Pursuant to this 
section, the Commission adopted Rule IOb-5, incorporating the language 
of section 17(a), but making it applicable to both the purchase and sale of 
securities.260 The Exchange Act was amended to include section 15(c)(l), 
giving the Commission power to promulgate rules defining manipulative, 
deceptive, or other fraudulent devices or contrivances used by brokers or 
dealers in the purchase or sale of any security other than on a national 
securities exchange.270 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission adopted 
Rule 15cl-2, which incorporated the basic language found in section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act.271 Sections 15(c)(l) and IO(b) are virtually identical in 
that both apply to the purchase or sale of securities. Section 15(c)(l), how-
ever, is limited to over-the-counter activities by brokers and dealers, while 
section IO(b) extends both to markets and to "any person."272 
It is within this statutory framework that the Commission and the courts 
have acted to protect the investing public from fraudulent selling prac-
2ois 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). Ashby, Federal Regulation of Securities Sales, 22 ILL. L. 
REY. 635 (1928). 
260 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). 
267 Ibid. 
268 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958). 
260 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949). 
270 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1958). 
271 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949). 
272 For a discussion of the history of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities 
acts, see generally Loss 1421-30. 
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tices.273 Perhaps the most successful, and certainly the most pervasive, im-
plementation of these provisions has been the imposition of the so-called 
"shingle theory," which provides a standard of fair dealing unique in a 
field comprised essentially of merchandising. Under this theory, a licensed 
broker-dealer, in doing business with the public, is said to "hang out his 
shingle" and thereby represent that he has expertise in the intricate business 
of investment, and that the standards of his calling proscribe unfair dealing 
with less well-informed customers, even in transactions where technically 
the broker-dealer is dealing at arm's length.274 This standard was first pro-
pounded in Duker & Duker,275 where the Commission held that a broker-
dealer allegedly acting as a principal willfully violated section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and section 15(c)(l) of the Exchange Act by charging prices 
"clearly excessive and unreasonable" in light of the current market prices. 
The Commission stated that "inherent in the relationship between a dealer 
and his customer is the vital representation that the customer will be dealt 
with fairly and in accordance with the standards of the profession."276 Al-
though there was no evidence adducible from the Commission's opinion as 
to what the "standards of the profession" were, nor as to what constituted 
an "excessive spread" between current market and the price charged to the 
customer,277 it was clear that the Commission had not relied upon tradi-
tional concepts of fraud, nor upon an agency relationship to provide the 
basis for the violation. However, reliance by the customers on their relation-
ship with the dealer was emphasized as a factor to be weighed in determin-
ing the dealer's legal responsibility. In 1943 the shingle theory received 
unqualified judicial affirmation in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC.278 Although 
the opinion of the Second Circuit in the Hughes case did not delineate the 
exact principles of law approved, the Commission has frequently utilized 
the holding of the case in proceedings against broker-dealers and their 
employees.279 The fraudulent conduct in Hughes involved the common 
pattern of reliance and riskless trading, with the dealer held to have charged 
prices not bearing a reasonable relation to the current market price of the 
securities. However, the court went further than in preceding cases and 
suggested that reliance upon the dealer-customer relationship was not an 
element of a violation of the standard of fair dealing.280 
273 As Rule 15cl-2 suggests, fraudulent selling practices are not limited to conduct 
adverse to the public, but may also be perpetrated against brokers and dealers by mem-
bers of the public and by other persons in the securities business itself. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15cl-2 (1949). 
274 See text accompanying note 262 supra. 
275 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). 
276 Id. at 388. For a discussion of the early history of the standard of fair dealing, 
see Lesh, supra note 260, at 1237. 
277 The Commission avoided the definitional problem by finding the spread clearly 
excessive and unreasonable. 
278 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). 
270 See cases cited note 285 infra. 
2so For subsequent judicial affirmation that reliance is not material to a breach of the 
implied duty of fair dealing, see Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Hughes v. 
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During the same period the Commission adopted an alternate solution 
to the problem of investor protection. The Commission revoked the regis-
tration of a broker-dealer which operated by securing the confidence of a 
customer-typically a widow uninitiated in securities investments who 
would turn over her savings for investment and reinvestment-and then 
charging prices marked-up 40 to 193 percent over the current market.281 
In finding this conduct to be a willful violation of section 15(c)(l) of the 
Exchange Act, the Commission relied on the theory that an agency relation-
ship had been created between the securities firm and each customer by 
oral representations and other confidences implying trust, despite the firm's 
protestations that confirmations had been couched in the "sold to you" 
form.282 This finding of an implied agency was related directly to the issue 
of fraud, since a failure to disclose material facts, particularly the amount 
of secret profits, is a violation of the fiduciary duty.283 
The Commission thus has alternative standards by which to judge sell-
ing practices: a shingle theory including an implied representation of fair 
dealing, and a fiduciary duty resulting from an implied agency. While the 
effect of the latter is to superimpose on the securities acts common-law 
duties inherent in an agency relationship,284 the shingle theory imposes no 
defined duties the breach of which constitutes fraud. Therefore, subsequent 
Commission proceedings where violations of the standard of fair dealing 
have been found have constituted efforts to define at least part of that duty 
"inherent in the relationship between a broker or dealer and his customer." 
As suggested by the Duker and Hughes cases, it is a fraudulent practice 
for a broker-dealer to charge a price not bearing a reasonable relationship 
to the current market price without disclosing the extent of his profit.285 
The execution of unauthorized transactions286 and the selling of securities 
at a market price materially affected by the seller287 have also been held 
fraudulent. The latter proposition is based on the theory that quotation of 
a price to a customer is an implied representation that such price bears a 
reasonable relationship to the price prevailing in a free and open market. 
SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. 
Del. 1951). 
281 Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043 (1941). 
282 See note 254 supra. 
283 An agent is subject to a fiduciary duty which may include a duty of full disclosure, 
and the mere failure to make such disclosure, if required, constitutes fraud. See REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 23, 24, 389 comment b, § 390 (1958); REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs 
§§ 471, 472 (1932); REsrATEMENT, REsrmmON § 8 (1937); REs'I'ATEMENT, TORTS § 551 
(1938). 
284 Cf. Lesh, supra note 260, at 1274-75. 
285 See, e.g., George Wales Allen, 39 S.E.C. 297 (1959); Paul Carroll Ferguson, 39 
S.E.C. 260 (1959); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900 (1959); Indiana State 
Securities Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118 (1957); E. H. Rollins, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945); Scott 
McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442 (1942). This implied representation has been held to apply 
to exchanges of securities as well as sales for cash. Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975 (1942). 
286 First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952). 
287 See, e.g., Sterling Securities Corp., 39 S.E.C. 487 (1959); Daniel & Co., 38 S.E.C. 
9 (1957). 
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Thus, in the sale of an over-the-counter security where the selling broker-
dealer dominates the market in that security, disclosure of the latter fact is 
required. Likewise, the doing of business by a broker-dealer is an implied 
representation of his solvency, and a failure to disclose insolvency is fraudu-
lent in that such conduct violates the standards of the profession.288 Re-
cently, the shingle theory has been applied to "boiler room" salesmen.280 
Reliance by a broker-dealer upon fraudulent sales literature for information 
to be disseminated to customers may constitute breach of the affirmative 
duty to investigate the accuracy of information presented to the investing 
public.290 
One of the most significant areas in which the Commission has employed 
the shingle theory is that of misrepresentations or omissions. While common-
law actions for deceit require proof of scienter and reliance, as well as mis-
representation of a present material fact,291 the Commission has taken the 
position that, under the standard of fair dealing, the scope of section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act and sections IO(b) and 15(c)(l) of the Exchange Act 
is not so limited.292 Frequently, representations such as the following are 
held to be fraudulent: "you will double your money in six months,"298 or 
"the return of the purchase price is insured."294 The position of the Com-
mission with regard to such statements is that "the antifraud provisions of 
the securities acts . . . contemplate at the very least, that recommendations 
of a security made to proposed purchasers shall have a reasonable basis 
and . . . they shall be accompanied by disclosure of known or easily as-
certainable facts bearing upon the justification for the representations."295 
Avoidance of fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale of securities requires 
reasonable and adequate inquiry into all the material facts bearing upon 
the representation, accompanied by disclosure of such facts.296 Thus, while 
those misrepresentations which constituted fraudulent selling practices 
under the common law remain so, the Commission has imposed an addi-
2ss See, e.g., Gill-Harkness&: Co., 38 S.E.C. 646 (1958); Cobb &: Co., 38 S.E.C. 166 (1958). 
289 For a discussion of boiler room sales practices and proposed Commission controls, 
see Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963). 
290 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). 
291 But cf. Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 546 (2d 
Cir. 1926); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven&: Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174, 174 N.E. 441, 444 
(1931). 
292 For a comparison of the common-law action for deceit with securities fraud con-
cepts, see 3 Loss 1430-44. 
298 D. F. Bemheimer &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000, Jan. 23, 
1963. 
294 Ronald I. Gershen, 39 S.E.C. 874 (1960). 
295 Best Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960. 
See also Ross Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7069, April 30, 
1963; Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, Feb. 
11, 1963; B. Fennekohl &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, Sept. 18, 
1962; Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, 
afj'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). 
296 See, e.g., Alexander Reid &:. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, 
Feb. 8, 1962. 
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tional duty of investigation, for failure of the securities salesman to acquaint 
himself with-and subsequently to disclose-the status of the security he 
is selling constitutes fraud. "Puffing," or seller's talk, an element of merchan-
dising recognized and accepted under the common-law doctrine of caveat 
emptor, has been declared specifically inapplicable to securities sales.297 
Moreover, attempts to avoid this requirement of adequate basis and dis-
closure by couching the representation in terms of opinion have been held 
to violate the obligation of fair dealing, thereby subjecting the seller to the 
sanctions of the securities acts.298 Nor will the seller be protected by a for-
tuitous rise in price if there was no adequate basis for predicting a price 
increase at the time of the sale.299 However, in this area, as in others where 
specific types of conduct have been held contrary to the basic obligation of 
fair dealing borne by those engaged in the sale of securities, the Commis-
sion has not explicity defined maximum limits or the scope of the require-
ment, but rather has conditioned its findings on such analysis as this: 
"none of the information available •.. provided a basis for [the] un-
restrained prediction."soo 
An omission violates the antifraud provisions of the securities acts301 if 
such omission is of a material fact and such fact is necessary in order to 
make the statement rendered, in light of the circumstances under which it 
is made, not misleading. The prohibition against omission has obvious 
application to sales literature presenting a false picture of the future growth 
of a business. In fact, however, the literature seldom makes any real pre-
dictions; rather, it relies upon an implied impression of potential success. 
Consequently, an omission can rarely be said to make any statement mis-
leading. On the other hand, where a business is, in fact, insolvent, omission 
has been found fraudulent when accompanied by such statements as "no 
risk" and "no chance of loss."302 However, since the gravamen of the 
fraudulent conduct is failure to disclose the insolvency, it would appear 
that the result of such a finding could be as easily reached by applying the 
more recent "adequate basis" test. The shingle theory can be said to have 
imposed much the same duty in the area of fraudulent omission as in the 
207 Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943); cf. B. Fennekohl & Co., SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, Sept. 18, 1962. 
208 See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Ross Securities, Inc., SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 7069, April 30, 1963. 
209 See Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, 
Feb. 11, 1963. 
800 Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, 
aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf. Alexander Reid & Co., 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, Feb. 8, 1962, where the Commission stated 
that prediction of a specific price increase of a speculative and promotional security is a 
"hallmark of fraud." 
801 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rules IOb and 15(c)(l) under the Exchange 
Act. 
802 See SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939). For other cases in• 
volving fraud by omission see Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939); Schamber 
v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960). 
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area of representations; in either case the violation is a failure to disclose, 
interpreted against the broad standard of fair dealing. 
Since in each of the above enumerated situations fraudulent conduct 
was found because the seller failed in a duty defined as "fair dealing," the 
finding of an implied agency used to provide a duty standard is little more 
than an application of the shingle theory in slightly different terms. Under 
the shingle theory, implication of a representation of fair dealing provides 
a flexible standard whereby the Commission has considerable discretion in 
determining what constitutes fair dealing; under the implied agency ratio-
nale, the flexibility is provided in defining what conduct between the parties 
vests the salesman with an agent's fiduciary duty. Thus the legal conse-
quences are almost always the same.303 Nevertheless, the Commission has 
frequently proceeded on the theory that, where a broker-dealer, ostensibly 
dealing at arm's length, generates a relationship of complete trust and con-
fidence with his customer, an implied agency is created.304 It has been 
stated that the intent of the parties controls the creation of an agency re-
lationship. 3015 Nevertheless, in Hughes v. SEC,806 where an agreement had 
been entered into with all customers that transactions were to be effected 
by the broker-dealer as principal, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia upheld the Commission's contention that a fiduciary duty ex-
isted, and held that since there had not been full disclosure of the difference 
between prices charged and current market price, the conduct was fraudu-
lent. The court dismissed the written agreement as ineffectual because most 
customers could not understand its legal effect. 
An implied general fiduciary duty has also been successfully utilized to 
curb "chuming"-excessive trading of a customer's securities account to 
increase the broker-dealer's profits.307 If the account is discretionary, i.e., 
under power of attorney the broker-dealer may purchase or sell at his 
discretion, overtrading is specifically proscribed by the rules promulgated 
pursuant to the Exchange Act.308 However, where no formal discretion is 
granted and the relationship is presumably that of a dealer-customer, it 
303 But see Lesh, supra note 260, at 1253, where it is pointed out that in determining 
whether prices charged by the broker-dealer are unrelated to current market price, if the 
Commission proceeds on a shingle theory reasonable profits are non-fraudulent, while an 
agent or fiduciary is liable for even small secret profits. 
804 See, e.g., Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960); Lawrence R. Leeby, 13 S.E.C. 499 
(1943); William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601 (1942); J. Logan &: Co., SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 6848, July 9, 1962. See also note 281 supra and accompanying 
text. For a list of suggested factors which may create this agency relationship, see Lesh, 
supra note 260, at 1269-74. 
805 Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053 (1941). 
806 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). This case concerned Arleen W. Hughes, doing 
business as E. W. Hughes & Co., not to be confused with the Charles Hughes case, cited 
note 278 supra. 
807 See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg, 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946), afj'd sub nom. Norris & Hirsh-
berg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); E. H. Rollins, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945). 
308 Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1949). The self-regulatory agencies have 
similar prohibitions: NYSE rules 408, 'if 2408, at 3702; 435, 'if 2435, at 3775; NASD Rules 
of Fair Practice, art. III, § 15(a). 
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could be contended that no amount of trading is excessive, since each trans-
action is theoretically conditioned upon customer approval.309 However, any 
situation in which a firm has such control over an account that it may 
engage in churning seems an appropriate case for the implication of an 
agency relationship, since the extent of control exercised suggests that a 
high degree of trust and confidence has been placed in the seller. The Com-
mission has found such conduct to be a clear violation of fiduciary duty. 
The similarity between the alternative standards imposed by the shingle 
theory and an implied agency is obvious. Since most selling violations in-
volve several types of fraudulent practice, assimilation of the theories 
seemed a logical approach to the solution of investor protection. This the 
Commission proceeded to do. For example, in Herbert R. May & Russell 
H. Phinney810 the Commission held that, since the requisite relationship of 
trust and confidence was present, the charging of prices greatly in excess of 
the market price was a violation of the anti-fraud provisions under either 
theory. As a principal, the dealer failed in his duty of fair dealing by not 
disclosing the market price; as an agent, he failed to divulge his profits in 
breach of trust. This juxtaposition suggests at least one conclusion: what-
ever the statutory prohibitions against certain selling practices, the laws 
governing the fraudulent sale of securities are today imbued with a stan-
dard of affirmative duty, whether this duty is based on an implied represen-
tation of fair dealing, or on an implied agency. 
While it has been suggested that much of the Commission's policy 
should be characterized as an emerging "know your merchandise" rule, 311 
this description embodies only half the duty imposed, in that a vital element 
of this obligation is a full disclosure of whatever facts are necessary to 
equalize the bargaining power of the parties. Although such fraudulent 
practices as churning and the charging of prices unrelated to the current 
market are not entirely disclosure violations, the decision to hold them 
fraudulent is based on the assumption that the customer might not have 
assented to the transaction had he gained full information concerning 
relevant market price or the amount and effect of the trading.312 The Com-
mission has reasoned that investor protection is best provided by apprising 
the customer of material facts so that a decision to buy, sell, or trade may 
be informed and well-considered. 
However, to say that an industry geared to merchandising must deal 
fairly, whether at arm's length or in confidence, does not provide definite 
substantive limits within which a firm must confine its selling practices. 
809 Cf. J. I:ogan & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6848, July 9, 1962. 
810 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948). 
811 See Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, Feb. 
8, 1962; Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 856 (1963). 
812 See cases cited note 307 supra. The requirement is well-advised, since firms have 
been willing to tell customers that, because they were acting at arm's length, a profit of 
40% was not too high, and have even told the Commission that the "sky is the limit" 
for profits in an over-the-counter transaction. Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1056 (1941). 
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What constitutes an excessive spread between the price charged a customer 
and the current market? What information must be disclosed? How much 
information, and of what kind, provides an adequate basis for predictions? 
When does frequent trading become churning? What course of dealing 
generates an agency relationship? These and similar questions318 continue 
to plague those involved in the securities business. The Commission's policy 
is one of ad hoc determination of violation, and thus after-the-fact definition 
of duty; this is made necessary by the complexity of the securities business. 
The intricate nature of securities merchandising and the myriad abuses to 
which it is subject prompted regulation initially, and this same complexity 
prevents definitive legislation and precise judicial treatment. These un-
answered questions are of degree, not of kind, and answers, for the most 
part, will be limited to specific fact situations. Nevertheless, Commission 
decisions and judicial affirmation thereof suggest partial guidelines. More-
over, recognizing that the imposition of an affirmative duty creates problems 
of vagueness and uncertainty, the Commission is at present promoting solu-
tions to alleviate some of the harshness inherent in after-the-fact definition. 
One such procedure is the official release, calling to the attention of the 
industry certain negative features of a particular security.814 Dissemination 
of such information charges a dealer with knowledge that failure to disclose 
at least the information contained in the release is violative of fair dealing 
standards. Direction by release is perhaps better suited to control of selling 
practices than is either the exercise of the formal rule-making power, neces-
sarily broadly couched, or case-by-case adjudication with its inherent un-
certainty.815 The release can provide antecedent examples of cases where 
disclosure of certain types of facts was thought to be essential, and a series 
of such releases would indicate concepts of duty in much the same manner 
as case decisions, while avoiding objections of after-the-fact vagueness. A 
second procedure is the expansion of the types of sanctions which may be 
imposed by the Commission. Under present law, the Commission has avail-
able only the sanction of denial or revocation of broker-dealer registra-
tion.816 An amendment to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, proposed by 
the SEC, would vest the Commission with discretion, in lieu of revocation 
of registration, to impose the lesser sanctions of suspension of registration 
for twelve months or less, or formal censure.817 Availability of these addi-
tional sanctions would provide more flexible powers, so that the Commis-
sion could invoke measures appropriate for dealing with particular kinds 
818 Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 
1961, where Rule l0b-5 was applied to require a duty of full disclosure by the corporate 
insider, although the imposition of the duty created conflicts with other obligations in-
herent in such a position. See generally Cary, supra note 311; 75 HARv. L. REv. 1449 
(1962): 60 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1962). 
814 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6525, April 
12, 1961. 
815 See generally Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963). 
816 See note 333 infra and accompanying text. 
817 S. 1642, H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1963). 
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or degrees of misconduct, rather than being limited to a choice between no 
sanction or an excessive or inappropriate one.318 
Another significant development in the rules governing the sale of 
securities presents a departure from past policy of the Commission and the 
self-regulatory associations; it also appears to pose many additional prob-
lems. This is the emergence of a so-called "suitability" rule. Article III, 
section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides as follows: 
"In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any 
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that 
the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the 
facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings 
and as to his financial situation and needs."319 
In several cases in review of NASD action pursuant to this suitability 
rule,820 the Commission has upheld NASD action, rejecting a contention 
that the suitability standard, because of vagueness, violates the nature 
and cause of accusation clause of the sixth amendment.321 The securities 
acts do not contain any provision requiring suitability, nor has the Com-
mission adopted such a rule under the acts. However, as indicated by the 
Special Study,822 recent boiler-room cases have suggested that lack of suita-
bility of a security recommended for purchase by a customer, in light of his 
particular financial situation and objectives, is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether a broker-dealer has fulfilled his obligation to treat 
his customers fairly.323 In other words, it appears that the Commission has 
itself interjected a standard of suitability as one aspect of the duty of fair 
dealing, regardless of whether the NASD has moved against the broker-
dealer under its Rules of Fair Practice. Although there are few cases to date 
wherein the Commission has suggested that the dealer must not only "know 
his merchandise," but also inquire into the needs and investment objectives 
of his customer and accommodate one to the other, the Special Study 
specifically recommended that "greater emphasis should be given by the 
Commission . . . to the concept of 'suitability.' "324 This recommendation 
was endorsed by the Commission.325 The possibility of increased attention 
818 See Special Study pt. 1, at 188. 
819 Although the NYSE has no "suitability" rule as such which compares to the 
NASD rule, it does have a "know your customer" requirement in Rule 405(1). This 
rule was primarily designed to protect member firms against irresponsible customers, and 
has generally been restricted to such use. Id. at 158. 
820 Philips &: Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956); First Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 6497, March 20, 1961; Boren&: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 6367, Sept. 19, 1960; Gerald M. Greenberg, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
6320, July 21, 1960. 
821 Boren &: Co., supra note 321. 
822 special Study pt. 1, at 238. 
828 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, 
afl'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Best Securities, Inc., SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960. 
824 special Study pt. 1, at 329. 
825 Letter from Chairman William L. Cary to Oren Harris, Chairman, Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, House of Representatives, April 5, 1963. 
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to the suitability requirement poses certain questions, most of which con-
cern the scope of the rule. While a suitability rule is subject to the same 
objections of indefiniteness as are other postulations of duty, these objections 
may be answered in the same way as with other rules.326 If the suitability 
rule is no more than a corollary of the duty arising under an implied 
agency through a confidential and discretionary course of dealing, it is 
simply another element tending to show fraud.327 On the other hand, if the 
rule is applied as a requirement in all, or even most situations, it presents 
a distinct departure from previous policy. Congressional and Commission 
regulation has been consistent with the free enterprise system in that the 
duty of fair dealing is a standard attending the bargaining process but not 
affecting the consummated terms of the transaction itself. Disclosure and 
investigation incident to such disclosure are calculated to provide enough 
information that even the neophyte investor has a basis for determining 
the suitability of a security in light of his own financial situation.328 How-
ever, broad application of a requirement that the dealer perform a suit-
ability evaluation is an interference with the terms of the transaction and 
goes considerably further than simple elimination of arm's-length dealing 
between broker-dealer and customer. In addition, if the standards of suit-
ability are "reasonableness" and "good faith," as they presumably would 
be, determination of suitability would be merely an after-the-fact substitu-
tion of the Commission's value judgment for that of the dealer. While 
heretofore the Commission has made such judgments, examination has 
been confined to readily ascertainable dealer conduct, such as churning, 
misrepresentation, or excessive price mark-ups. A judgment as to suitability 
necessarily includes inquiry into the speculative matter of customer needs 
and purposes, as well as the relative merits of the securities involved in 
the transaction. Since this valuation is one which the Commission has 
specifically avoided, and wisely so, in the past,329 a rule combining such a 
determination with additional speculative elements is even less desirable. 
Significantly, however, the suitability requirement has been limited to 
situations where several other clear violations of the anti-fraud provisions 
were present,sso or where high pressure sales techniques were used.831 Thus, 
it may well be that the suitability rule will be limited to cases involving 
multiple frauds and peripheral areas involving a composite of selling prac-
326 Cf. text accompanying note 313 supra. 
327 Cf. First Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6497, March 
20, 1961. 
328 In D. F. Bemheimer & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000, Jan. 
22, 1963, the Commission cited three recent cases for the proposition that it is inconsistent 
with principles of fair dealing and violative of the securities laws to fail to disclose known 
or reasonably available information necessary to provide the investor with a fair picture 
of the security being offered. 
329 See Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 11, 15, 
July 11, 1962. 
830 Cases cited note 320 supra. 
831 Cases cited note 323 supra. 
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tices contrary to the obligation of fair dealing, but where evidence of 
specific violations is difficult to obtain. 
B. Securities and Exchange Commission Sanctions 
After looking at what practices are deemed fraudulent under the federal 
securities acts, the various sanctions which may be imposed by the Com-
mission on a seller who has violated these provisions should be examined. 
First, at the Commission level, a registered broker-dealer who engages in 
fraudulent practices in violation of the securities acts may find himself 
subject to several possible sanctions. The Commission may bring a civil 
proceeding in a federal court enjoining the broker or dealer from engaging 
in further fraudulent activities,332 and the federal court may issue a tem-
porary or permanent injunction which may later serve as the basis for re-
vocation of registration, provided the revocation is in the public interest. 
Through its own administrative procedures, the Commission may revoke 
the broker-dealer registration.833 The effect of such a revocation is to re-
move the broker-dealer, its proprietors, and any salesmen who are found 
to be a cause of the revocation, from the securities business until permission 
for re-entry may be obtained. The only way the Commission can proceed 
against an individual salesman is through an action against the broker-
dealer, and this is rather harsh where only one saleman in a large firm is 
guilty of violations. During the pendency of the revocation proceedings, 
the Commission may temporarily suspend the registration for the protection 
of investors.834 Finally, in situations of extreme abuse and fraud, the Com-
mission may transmit evidence to the United States Attorney General, who 
may at his discretion bring a criminal action against the offenders.335 The 
Commission has observed that criminal proceedings are more effective than 
administrative sanctions in combating boiler-room activities.336 During the 
years 1959 and 1960, the Commission referred an average of forty-six cases 
per year to the Attorney General,337 and in the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1961, 126 convictions were obtained in forty-five cases.338 Certainly the 
criminal sanction is a very powerful deterrent in the fraud area, and con-
tinued referrals and vigorous prosecution are desirable. 
C. Self-Regulatory Agency Sanctions 
A broker or dealer may also be subject to sanctions imposed by one 
or more of the several self-regulatory bodies existing in the securities in-
332 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958). 
833 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780-b (1958). The Commission may also expel or 
suspend from a national securities exchange any member who has violated a provision 
of the Exchange Act. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3) (1958). A similar provision 
exists with regard to the NASD. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(1)(2) (1958). 
334 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780-b (1958). 
885 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958). 
836 25 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1959). 
837 27 SEC ANN. REP. 259 (table 26) (1961). 
838 Id. at 165. 
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dustry. First, the NASD, which polices the over-the-counter market, is re-
quired by the Exchange Act to pass rules designed to prevent fraudulent 
practices.839 Pursuant to this provision the NASD has passed rules of fair 
practice. The basic philosophy of these rules is that "A member, in the 
conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor 
and just and equitable principles of trade."840 Also, specific rules make the 
following practices violations of the rules of fair practice: unreasonable 
mark-ups,841 excessive transactions in a discretionary situation,842 and the 
recommending of unsuitable securities.848 Upon a finding of a violation of 
the rules of fair practice, the NASD has certain sanctions available.8H 
Those broker-dealers who are members of the New York Stock Exchange 
are subject to specific NYSE sanctions for fraudulent selling practices. The 
Exchange Act requires that the rules of the Exchange, like those of the 
NASD, provide for expulsion, suspension, or discipline for violations of 
"just and equitable principles of trade."845 The constitution of the Ex-
change provides for sanctions against any member or allied member who is 
adjudged guilty of "fraud or of fraudulent acts,"846 or willful violation of 
the Exchange Act.847 The Board of Governors of the Exchange has also 
adopted rules governing conduct of members and employees in their selling 
activities.848 Violation of these rules subjects a member to certain sanctions. 
However, few disciplinary proceedings concerning selling practices are 
instituted by the Exchange, and the value of this potential sanction is at 
present subject to considerable doubt.349 The other national exchanges have 
similar anti-fraud provisions, but enforcement there is of even less signifi-
cance because either the volume of sales is so low as to have little impact 
on the industry, or the detection procedures are very poor.siso 
D. Investor Remedies 
In addition to the various disciplinary actions which may be brought by 
the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies, a broker or dealer may 
also be subjected to certain sanctions available to the investor. The securi-
ties acts explicity state that the remedies therein exist in addition "to any 
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."851 
Thus, a common-law deceit action is available, and a defrauded investor 
339 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 70o-3(b)(7) (1958). 
840 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 1. 
841 Id. § 4; see Nat'! Ass'n of Security Dealers, Inc., 17 S.E.C. 459 (1944). 
842 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice art. m, § 15(a). 
848 Id.§ 2. 
844 Id. art. V. 
S41S 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1958). 
846 NYSE Constitution art. XIV, § 1. 
847 NYSE Constitution art. XIV, § 7. 
848 NYSE Rule 401 ,I 2401, at 3695. 
849 Special Study pt. 1, at 320. 
81SO Id. pt. 1, at 321-22. 
81Sl 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958); 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(bb) 
(1958). 
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may retain the stock and sue for damages.852 However, because of the scien-
ter requirement, this remedy, in most jurisdictions, is not as favorable as 
the civil liabilities created by the securities acts.853 The investor may instead 
decide to return the stock and rescind the contract, receiving back his con-
sideration. 354 Rescission is generally available where there has been misrep-
resentation of a material fact relied upon by the purchaser, but this remedy 
is fraught with difficulties, such as the requirement at law of tender of the 
stock to the seller before the suit is brought.355 While a successful damage 
action will usually give the investor his loss-of-bargain remedy,356 rescission 
allows the investor to recover only his purchase money. An investor might 
also seek to pursue a breach of warranty action.857 In fact, under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, there is a built-in suitability requirement in the 
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.358 The problem is that 
investment securities are not "goods" as defined by the Code,859 and the 
warranty provision applies only to goods. However, the warranty provision 
might be applied by analogy to securities, as is suggested in a drafter's com-
ment.860 The uncertainty of this remedy, however, makes it of doubtful 
value. In addition to the common-law remedies, a defrauded investor may 
also have a statutory cause of action under the applicable Blue Sky law.861 
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides for civil liability in the case 
of any person who sells a security making an untrue statement of a material 
fact or who omits to state a material fact without being able to show that he 
was not at fault in making or failing to make the statement.862 This section 
has its drawbacks because it is available only against the seller, and not 
against others who may have induced the investor to buy. Also, the seller 
may avoid liability by showing that he did not know and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or the omission. The 
statute of limitations is short and no recovery for attorney's fees is allowed. 
Finally, the out-of-pocket damage measure is used, while in a fraud action 
852 See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Acts, 43 YALE L.J. 227 
(19!!!!). 
853 Scienter is an element of common-law deceit, but it is generally conceded that no 
such requirement exists under the civil liabilities imposed by the securities acts. See 
REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 526 (1934). On the absence of a scienter requirement under the 
federal civil liability provisions, see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 
1962). 
854. See Shulman, supra note 352, at 231. 
855 See E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guar. &: Trust Co., 271 N.Y. 124, 2 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1936). 
856 The majority of courts grant loss-of-bargain damages in a deceit action, while a 
minority confine damages to out-of-pocket losses. See PROSSER, TORTS 568, 571 (2d ed. 1955). 
857 See Shulman, supra note 352, at 228. 
858 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. 
859 For the definition of "goods," see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1). 
800 The comment follows § 2-105(1) and cites Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 
479 (1934), as authority for applying the warranty provision by analogy to securities. 
861 See 3 Loss 1631, 1682. 
862 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958). See generally Latty, The Aggrieved 
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 
18 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (195!!). 
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at common law the measure of damages is usually based on the loss-of• 
bargain rule.363 
The Exchange Act includes no provision for civil liability comparable 
to section 12(2) of the Securities Act. However, Rule IOb-5, enacted pursuant 
to section IO of the ~xchange Act, has been interpreted by the courts as 
giving rise to an implied civil liability for violation of its antifraud pro-
visions. Because the securities acts provide for several express civil liabili-
ties, it is difficult to infer the legislative intent necessary to imply a civil 
liability where none exists in the express language of the statute. Neverthe-
less, since the defrauded seller was not protected by the securities acts, an 
implied cause of action was thought desirable by the courts.364 The Supreme 
Court has declined to hear cases questioning the propriety of this implied 
liability, and it now seems clear that implied civil liability under Rule 
IOb-5 has complete judicial acceptance. 
The elements necessary to support a IOb-5 action are: (1) violation of 
IOb-5 in connection with either the sale or purchase of a security and (2) 
the direct or indirect use of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national 
securities exchange in connection with the sale or purchase.365 It is generally 
conceded that recovery under IOb-5 is broader than a common-law deceit 
action, but to what extent depends upon the jurisdiction. The element of 
scienter is not necessary for a I0b-5 action, but in those states with a broad 
disclosure duty in deceit actions IOb-5 may merely be a codification of the 
common law.366 The element of reliance, necessary in deceit, has also been 
held to be an indispensable element of a IOb-5 action,367 but there is 
authority to the contrary.368 
An interesting aspect of the implied civil liability embodied in IOb-5 
is that, since this rule applies to "any person," it has been used to remedy 
misuse of corporate insider information. In the landmark case of Cady, 
Roberts & Co.369 an obligation was imposed on insiders not to take advan-
tage of nonpublic information disclosed for a corporate purpose. This 
seems far removed from fraud in the ordinary sale of securities, but arguably 
necessary because few jurisdictions require corporate insiders to disclose 
confidential information when dealing with existing shareholders.870 Re-
cent judicial developments extending the scope of IOb-5 in connection with 
corporate insiders and dominant shareholders give reason to believe that 
363 E.g., Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959). 
864 See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
365 See generally White, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Swindlers and the 
Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. 129 (1959). 
366 See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 60 (N.D. Ohio 1959). 
867 See Reed v. Riddle Airline, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 
208 F. Supp. 808 (En. Wis. 1962); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955). 
368 See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
369 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 76803 (S.E.C. Nov. 8, 1961). 
370 See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 80 (rev. ed. 1946); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 
615 (1933). 
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the role of this rule as a remedy in the corporate setting will be extended.371 
Another problem existing under IOb-5 is that there is no federal statute 
of limitations applicable, and the courts have utilized the statute of limita-
tions applicable to fraud actions of the state in which the federal court is 
sitting.372 This gives rise to lack of uniformity from state to state, although 
the cause of action is federal. Also, since the courts have been willing to 
apply IOb-5 civil liability to both buyers and sellers,373 this means that the 
restrictions which exist under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, applicable 
to a suit by a defrauded purchaser, are rendered nugatory because IOb-5 
encompasses all possible section 12(2) causes of action. The result is that 
the courts, in order to give a defrauded seller a federal cause of action, have 
by judicial legislation made section 12(2) of negligible importance. 
As a final remedy, the federal courts are empowered under the securities 
acts to grant ancillary relief, such as temporary injunctions.374 Section 12(2) 
of the Securities Act sets up certain legal consequences, but does not restrict 
the procedure or form of action the claimant must use. While it appears 
that the securities acts provide the defrauded investor with comprehensive 
relief, it is interesting to note that investors have made relatively infrequent 
use of the remedies provided by the federal securities acts.375 
E. Special Study Findings and Recommendations 
The Special Study devoted considerable attention to selling practices.376 
After a thorough study of the present law, the evolution of the Commis-
sion's theories of fraudulent practices, detection problems, and the role of 
the self-regulatory agencies, the Study concluded that "some segments of 
the industry appear to be earnestly promoting high standards of selling 
while others seem only to be earnestly promoting sales."377 It was also made 
clear that no quantitative measurement of the extent of fraudulent practices 
was intended, but these practices were found to exist throughout the in-
dustry, from the boiler-rooms to the well-known brokerage firms.378 
The Special Study made several specific recommendations. It urged that 
the large broker-dealer firms strengthen supervision of the selling activities 
of their personnel by greater use of electronic data processing equipment 
programmed to expose overtrading and other fraudulent practices. The 
basis of this recommendation was that even in the responsible firms indi-
s11 See Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), wherein a 
corporation succeeded in a cause of action against a corporate insider for fraudulently 
inducing the corporation to issue stock for worthless consideration even though questions 
of corporate mismanagement were involved. See 62 M1cH. L. REv. 339 (1963). See also 
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), wherein failure of a 
dominant shareholder to disclose the reason for a change in the market price of the 
corporation's stock was held actionable under lOb-5. 
372 See Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956). 
873 See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
374 See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). 
375 See 3 Loss 1685. 
876 See generally Special Study pt. 1, at 237-330. 
377 Id. at 323. 
878 Id. at 325. 
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vidual salesmen engage in fraudulent practices; thus closer supervmon 
aided by electronic data processing would be valuable in detecting and 
curbing abuses. It was also recommended that the self-regulatory agencies 
strengthen their enforcement procedures and assure more effective supervi-
sion of firm selling practices. The NASD already has rules covering the major 
selling abuses, but detection of violations could be greatly improved. Like-
wise, the NYSE has rules governing fraudulent selling practices, but the 
limited number of disciplinary proceedings instituted suggested to the 
Study either a failure in the detection program or a reluctance to acknowl-
edge selling abuses as a matter of concern. The self-regulatory agencies 
could play a key role in curbing fraudulent selling practices, and every at-
tempt should be made to encourage this. To supplement these measures 
relating to control by firms and self-regulatory agencies, the Special Study 
suggested that the Commission pass rules requiring additional record-keep-
ing to facilitate discovery of abusive selling practices.379 Furthermore, it was 
recommended that the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies give 
more emphasis to suitability by promulgating statements of policy further 
elucidating what the concept means. The authors of the Report felt that 
the suitability concept is important and should be fully developed. Clearly, 
if suitability is to become a meaningful requirement in the securities in-
dustry, clearer standards are necessary so that the scope of this requirement 
can be ascertained. 
The Study further advocated that wider and more prominent use be 
made of disclosures officially filed in connection with selling activities. For 
example, brokers and dealers should show reports and proxy statements 
to prospective customers or advise where they may be found. While some 
doubt may exist as to the ability of the average investor to interpret effec-
tively such information, it should certainly be made available. Investor 
education is essential to the elimination of selling practice abuses. In order 
to eliminate some of the pressure and incentive now existing for large 
volume sales, it was recommended that the compensation of salesmen be 
less dependent on the volume of securities sold. The commission method 
of compensation may be inherent in the industry, but it encourages over-
trading and the recommendation of securities on which the commission 
is highest, regardless of the merit of the securities. It is not very probable 
that the commission method of compensation will disappear, but im-
plementation of this proposal would help eliminate such practices as churn-
ing and the charging of unreasonable prices. 
Finally, it was urged that the sanctions available to the Commission be 
expanded so that disciplinary action might be taken against one or a few 
salesmen in a firm without involving the entire firm. The proposed legisla-
tion incorporates such a provision.879a Presently, to discipline one errant 
salesman the Commission must discipline the whole firm-a sanction which 
can be very harsh as compared with the violation. 
S79 Id. at 328. 
S79a S. 1642, H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1963). 
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F. Conclusion 
It is apparent that court and Commission proceedings of recent months 
have instituted highly significant changes in the level of integrity required 
in broker-dealer operations. Full realization of the importance of these 
developments may decrease to some extent the significance of the Special 
Study findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, the Study constitutes 
a highly constructive analysis of selling practices generally, and certainly 
deserves great attention for that reason. It is significant, however, that the 
Study conclusions are aimed primarily at continuing and increased emphasis 
on the traditional standards applicable to the securities industry. As 
such, they simply embody specific extensions of existing policy. Essen-
tially, that policy is one of proscribing certain conduct peculiar to the sale 
of securities, primarily that which breaches concepts of fair dealing. It is 
too late to deny either the necessity for securities regulation or the efficacy 
of utilizing regulatory power to create a standard of professionalism 
throughout the industry. Elimination of many fraudulent sales practices 
could undoubtedly be accomplished by the imposition of a general duty of 
disclosure to the customer, thereby equalizing bargaining power. 
An expansion of the methods of detecting sales fraud through requiring 
more complete records of transactions was recommended by the Special 
Study. Increased qualification requirements for personnel involved in the 
securities business880 and greater control over sales practices through the 
use of electronic data processing were also recommended. Unquestionably, 
implementation of these recommendations would serve to reduce, directly 
or indirectly, the susceptibility of securities sales to fraudulent practices. 
However, to increase duties of disclosure and investigation, and to widen 
the scope of conduct considered fraudulent is not to eliminate the conduct. 
Awareness that conduct is fraudulent and subject to sanction is not· al-
ways an effective deterrent; nor can increased supervision alone eliminate 
deleterious practices. Fraud is a pervasive evil, whatever the context, and 
in a merchandising industry so rapidly expanding, with burgeoning sales 
posing so high a potential for fraudulent practice, many investors could 
continue to be irrevocably injured. Therefore, additional deterrents should 
be provided which would conform to Commission policy and at the same 
time provide redress for injured investors. 
First, a strictly enforced net capital requirement, possibly accompanied 
by a bonding procedure, would help assure that defrauded investors could 
recoup their losses; this would also help discourage fringe operations, such 
as boiler-rooms, because bonding would be very expensive for this type of 
establishment. Second, a simple federal remedy available to defrauded in-
vestors should be enacted by Congress. A cause of action should arise out of 
any violation of the anti-fraud provisions. The provision should have a 
uniform statute of limitations, and a provision allowing recovery of reason-
able attorney's fees. Third, in situations where willful disregard of estab-
880 Sec section I infra. 
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lished standards of conduct can be shown, the defrauded investor should be 
able to recover double damages. The purpose of this provision would be 
analogous to the treble damage action in the antitrust area in that removal 
of the economic incentive to operate fraudulently would serve as a deter-
rent, as well as provide relief for the investor. 
Finally, more effort should be expended in the area of investor educa-
tion. This could be accomplished to some degree with a publicity campaign 
calculated to illustrate such practices as churning, wild and extravagant 
claims of profits, and the customary unreliability of information received 
from boiler-room operators. The campaign should also make more apparent 
the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-
regulatory agencies. Alerting the public to the potential areas and methods 
of fraud is a logical and necessary component of the present selling prac-
tice regulations. An informed general public would provide a deterrent to 
fraud and implement present policy in several ways. It would greatly 
facilitate detection of frauds through timely complaint. It would reduce 
the effectiveness of high pressure sales campaigns and other sales practices 
which are presently aided by the purchaser's ignorance and susceptibility 
to innuendo. It would complement the full disclosure requirements now 
imposed on the securities industry by creating greater equality of bargain-
ing power. Above all, an educated public might demand the same standards 
of performance of their broker-dealers as is now required by the Commis-
sion and the self-regulatory agencies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although it is apparent that there is room for improvement in the prac-
tices of many segments of the securities industry, the Report of the Special 
Study has demonstrated that the approach of the government to regulation 
of the industry should continue to be based on the same philosophy with 
which federal securities regulation originated in the 1930's. It is significant 
that Mr. Justice Douglas, then chairman of the Commission, indicated that 
it was the intent of his agency to let self-regulation play the key regulatory 
role. In his words, "Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, be-
hind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope 
that it would never have to be used."381 This approach is certainly consist-
ent with recognition by the Study, that the securities industry has for the 
most part shown itself to be imbued with a considerable sense of public 
responsibility. Chairman Cary, in speaking of a Special Study, has stated: 
"[I]t is not a picture of pervasive fraudulent activity and in this respect 
contrasts markedly with the hearings and findings of the early Thirties 
381 Quoted in The Wall Street J., Oct. 8, 1963, p. 14, col. 4. After noting the fact that 
reference to firearms has never been particularly pleasant to securities men, the Journal 
also pointed out that, notwithstanding the Study's emphasis on a government-securities 
industry partnership, many in the securities industry fear that the government intends to 
shrink sharply the industry's role in the partnership. 
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preceding the enactment of the Federal securities laws. The Study con-
firms the strength of those laws and the heightened sense of obligation 
of the financial community."3B2 
Keeping this in mind, the writers of this comment have attempted no 
comprehensive coverage of the problems attending the function of the 
securities industry; rather, the four topics discussed represent specific areas 
of operation in which the need for reform does in fact seem clear. While 
no claim is made to having devised a panacea for the problem areas dealt 
with, it is submitted that the recommendations herein articulated should 
be considered as solutions for the complex problems involved. Certainly, if 
the level of competence of securities personnel is raised, if corporate pub-
licity is confined to the facts of corporate life, if investment advisers assume 
a fiduciary responsibility with respect to those whom they advise, and if 
more effective efforts are made to eliminate undesirable selling practices, 
no one can deny that strength will have been added to the securities in-
dustry and in turn to the entire economy. 
Robert N. Dorosin 
Ira J. Jaffe 
Rolfe A. Worden 
James C. Lockwood 
Willoughby C. Johnson 
382 Excerpt from a letter of Chairman Cary, printed in the New York Times, April 
4, 1963, p. 40, col. I. (Emphasis added.) 
